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ABSTRACT 
In Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind Jaworski argues that “hylomorphism 
elegantly solves a number of philosophical problems in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of mind”. Relying on his hylomorphic account of structure, Jaworski 
develops a metaphysical theory of the mind-body relation whereby minded creatures 
like us are quantities of physical materials structured in appropriate ways. Our 
structured parts have powers. Further structuring activity coordinates the exercise of 
these powers, enabling us to walk, talk, think and feel. Jaworski claims to be able to 
rely on hylomorphic structure in this way to provide a theory of the mind-body relation 
that deserves to be taken at least as seriously as more familiar theories in the 
philosophy of mind. The dissertation considers this claim, concentrating on a 
comparison between Jaworski’s theory and the mind-body theories of his physicalist 
rivals. The dissertation first sets out the metaphysical context for assessing Jaworski’s 
claim by describing the compositional ontological framework that provides the 
background to the theories of both Jaworski and the physicalists. Having set out this 
metaphysical context the dissertation carries out an assessment of the competing 
theories. The first stage of the assessment considers the relative merits of Jaworski’s 
general hylomorphic metaphysics and the metaphysics of the physicalists, in particular, 
whether their metaphysics have the ontological resources to provide an acceptable 
principle of composition. The second stage compares their competing mind-body 
theories, in particular, their solutions to the problem of mental causation and the hard 
problem of consciousness. The dissertation concludes that Jaworski’s mind-body 
theory does deserve to be taken as seriously as the theories of his physicalist rivals but 
that, ultimately, the merits of Jaworski’s theory depends on whether he is able to dispel 
concerns over the realist claims that he makes in relation to his hylomorphic structures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 In Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind - How Hylomorphism Solves the 
Mind-Body Problem Jaworski argues that “hylomorphism elegantly solves a number of 
philosophical problems in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind” . Relying on his 1
hylomorphic account of structure, Jaworski develops a metaphysical theory of the 
mind-body relation whereby minded creatures like us are quantities of physical 
materials structured in appropriate ways. Our structured parts - hearts, brains, etc - 
have powers. Further structuring activity coordinates the exercise of these powers, 
enabling us to walk, talk, think and feel. Jaworski claims to be able to rely on structure 
in this way to provide a theory of the mind-body relation that provides elegant solutions 
to the various mind-body problems. His aim is to show that his hylomorphic mind-body 
theory “should be taken seriously - at least as seriously as more familiar theories in the 
philosophy of mind such as non-reductive physicalism, emergentism, and Russellian 
monism” . In this dissertation I consider how far Jaworski achieves this aim. I 2
concentrate on Jaworski’s rivalry with the physicalists: does Jaworski show that his 
hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation deserves to be taken at least as seriously 
as physicalist mind-body theories? Theories of the mind-body relation have to be 
considered within the context of a general metaphysical framework. So when 
contrasting Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory with the physicalist alternatives I look at the 
competing hylomorphic and physicalist metaphysical worldviews. This not only allows 
me to assess whether Jaworski’s mind-body theory deserves to be taken at least as 
seriously as the physicalist theories but also casts light on the ontological nature of 
Jaworski’s dispute with the physicalists. The rest of this Section provides an overview 
of the dissertation. 
1.2 A metaphysical theory of the mind-body relation provides an account of the 
relation between mental and physical phenomena. This can be seen as part of the 
overall metaphysical project of providing a consistent view of the fundamental nature of 
reality. As Lowe says “reality as a whole is unitary and necessarily self-consistent” . So 3
when psychology and the physical sciences describe mental and physical phenomena 
they are describing different aspects of this same reality and must be at least 
consistent with each other. A metaphysical theory of the mind-body relation provides a 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 336. 1
 Jaworski (2016), p. 336. 2
 Lowe (2002), p.3. 3
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metaphysical framework within which this consistency can be achieved. Both Jaworski 
and his physicalist rivals can agree to a compositional ontology whereby reality 
consists of fundamental physical materials arranged in varying degrees of complexity. 
And they can agree that this fundamental reality can be described in different ways 
depending on whether the description is concerned with the behaviour of the 
fundamental physical materials, and is thus part of physics, or with the behaviour of 
complex arrangements of such materials, and is thus part of the special sciences, 
including psychology. Where Jaworski and the physicalists part company is over the 
ontological implications of the special sciences. This leads to different ontologies - 
different worldviews of the fundamental nature of reality. This difference in their 
ontological commitments, in turn, leads to different theories of the mind-body relation. 
Physicalists (at least according to Jaworski - see below) claim that everything can be 
exhaustively described by the most empirically adequate physics. This means that for 
them the phenomena described by psychology must not be distinct from, must be 
nothing over and above, the phenomena described by physics. Jaworski’s ontology, on 
the other hand, includes hylomorphic structure in addition to the phenomena included 
in the physicalists' ontology, so that his theory of the mind-body relation can draw on 
these extra ontological resources. 
1.3 A way of assessing these competing theories of the mind-body relation is 
required. I carry out the assessment in two related stages. First, I consider the merits of 
Jaworski’s hylomorphism as a general metaphysical theory or worldview. In particular, I 
consider whether Jaworski’s hylomorphic principle of composition is preferable to the 
principles of composition available to the physicalists and thus provides support for his 
general metaphysical theory. If his hylomorphic theory of the fundamental nature of 
reality is preferable to the competing physicalist theories then this provides one basis 
for preferring his hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation, being a specific 
application of his general hylomorphic ontology. Secondly, I consider how far Jaworski’s 
hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation is an attractive theory, distinct from and 
potentially superior to the physicalist theories. In particular, does Jaworski’s mind-body 
theory enable him to provide a better solution to the problem of mental causation and 
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the hard problem of consciousness . This two stage assessment is related. A general 4
metaphysical theory of the fundamental nature of reality must be judged, in part, by 
how far it successfully accounts for the place of the mind within a physical world. And a 
theory of the mind-body relation must be judged, in part, by reference to its place within 
an acceptable general metaphysical theory. My main focus throughout is on clarifying 
the nature of the ontological disagreement between Jaworkski and the physicalists 
concerning the mind-body relation.
1.4 The dissertation is arranged as follows:
In Section 2 I describe a compositional ontological framework for the purpose of 
providing the background for the general metaphysical theories of Jaworski and 
the physicalists and for the development of their theories of the mind-body 
relation, and consider the different ways in which the framework can be 
interpreted. 
In Section 3, I describe physicalist interpretations of the framework and the 
implications this has for physicalist theories of the mind-body relation.
In Section 4 I describe Jaworski’s interpretation of the framework and set out 
Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation. 
In Section 5 I carry out the first stage of the assessment of Jaworski’s 
hylomorphism, considering its merits as a general metaphysical theory of the 
nature of reality in the light of some of the arguments of its critics.
In Section 6 I carry out the second stage of the assessment, considering the 
arguments for Jaworski’s theory of the mind-body relation, in particular how it 
purports to solve the mind-body problems relating to mental causation and 
consciousness. This allows me to assess Jaworski’s claim that his mind-body 
theory deserves to be taken at least as seriously as the more familiar physicalist 
 This two stage assessment follows Jaworski’s argument for his theory of the mind-4
body relation in Jaworski (2011). At p. 309 of that work he says: “There are at least two 
arguments in favour of a hylomorphic theory of the mind. The first appeals to the 
general hylomorphic worldview. Since there is good reason to endorse hylomorphism in 
general …, says the argument, there is good reason to endorse a hylomorphic 
approach to mental phenomena specifically. The second argument claims that a 
hylomorphic theory of mind does a better job solving mind-body problems than 
competing theories …”. 
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theories. I conclude that Jaworski’s theory deserves to be taken seriously but 
that the potential advantages of his theory over the theories of his physicalist 
rivals ultimately depends on the credibility of his structural realism, and that 
there are grounds for questioning what I refer to as his realist credentials. 
2. A COMPOSITIONAL ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Jaworski says that hylomorphism, like physicalism, is committed to the claim 
that structured individuals are ultimately “exhaustively decomposable into fundamental 
physical materials” . This is part of the intuitively attractive view that all physical things, 5
such as molecules, tables, and minded creatures like us, are composed of the same 
type of physical material, the material that will be exhaustively described by a future 
empirically adequate physics. At the same time this view on the composition can make 
it difficult to explain how minded creatures like us, with our mental properties, fit into a 
physical world so conceived. In developing an ontological framework within which to 
consider hylomorphism and physicalism I will adopt this compositional assumption.  
Developing this type of framework is first and foremost a metaphysical project, albeit 
one informed by science. The different interpretations of the framework set out the 
metaphysical possibilities, leaving it to science and experience to tell us which of the 
metaphysical possibilities are plausibly true in the actual world . In developing the 6
framework it is necessary to say something about the nature of the basic physical 
building blocks that are assumed to be its basic constituents, the principle of 
composition determining when the building blocks compose a composite object, and 
the view to be taken of the properties that characterise the building blocks and 
composite objects. For the purpose of developing the framework I will, like Jaworski, 
adopt a substance-attribute ontology, with substances and attributes being irreducibly 
conceptually distinct and fundamental. And, again like Jaworski, I will use the term 
‘property’ in place of ‘attribute’ and understand it to cover both monadic properties and 
relations, n-adic properties (although sometimes I will refer to properties and relations if 
this makes things clearer). A state on this view can be treated as an object instantiating 
a property at a particular time or during a particular period of time. Events can then be 
treated as changes of states.
 Jaworski (2016), p. 251. 5
 As Lowe says: “Knowing how the world could be in respect of its fundamental 6
structure, we must judge as best we can how it is by determining how well our 
experience can be accommodated with this or that alternative metaphysical possibility 
as regards that structure” - Lowe (1998), p.23 (italics in original). 
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Basic building blocks of reality 
2.2 I will assume that there are fundamental physical entities, the basic building 
blocks, that are capable of composing composite wholes. Further I will treat these 
fundamental entities as basic particles, to be understood as simples, that is, entities 
without proper parts . These simples are simple substances, non-composite bearers of 7
properties. I will refer to the properties characterising the basic particles as basic 
properties. I will then refer to composites of such particles as objects, composite 
substances, composite bearers of properties . In keeping with what I have said above 8
about the development of the framework being informed by science, the reference to 
the fundamental particles can be treated as a placeholder for whatever microscopic 
entities physics eventually discovers to be actually down there.
Principle of composition 
2.3 Once the basic building blocks are in place the next part of the process of 
constructing the framework is to adopt a principle of composition. This can be 
discussed in terms of van Inwagen’s special composition question: when is it true that 
for some object y, the xs compose the y? . If we take ‘the xs’ to be a plural referring 9
expression referring to two or more basic particles, then this question is asking in what 
circumstances an arrangement of such particles compose an object. Insofar as an 
arrangement of particles compose an object - y - that object will be a composite object 
with the particles as its proper parts. A mereological universalist endorses unrestricted 
composition whilst a mereological nihilist denies any form of composition, recognising 
only mereological simples. Van Inwagen’s answer to his special composition question 
falls between these two extremes, a position of restricted composition. For van 
 As Lowe says “it is natural to assume that although an object’s component parts may 7
themselves be composite objects … there must eventually be an end to such a series 
of whole-part relations, the terminus being provided by objects which are by their very 
nature simple or non-composite”. Lowe (2002), p. 60.
 Jaworski’s hylomorphism is not committed to the fundamental building blocks being 8
particulate on the basis that it is for the “relevant empirical disciples to tell us what their 
natures are” - Jaworski (2016), p. 107. He prefers to use the term ‘fundamental 
physical materials’ to indicate his neutrality on the basis that this leaves it open whether 
such entities are particulate or continuous. I find it easier to refer to, and to conceive of, 
the basic building blocks as if they were particulate. I do not, however, intend anything 
substantive to turn on this departure from Jaworski for present purposes.
 See van Inwagen (1990), p. 30.9
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Inwagen the point at which an arrangement of particles - the xs - compose an object is 
when the arrangement reaches a level of complexity at which it is characterised by a 
novel property, that is, a property that cannot be understood in terms of the joint effect 
of the properties of the constituent basic particles. I will refer to such novel properties 
as emergent properties. Jaworski develops a principle of composition that is similar to 
van Inwagen’s. It is possible to adopt a position of restricted composition without 
relying on emergent properties. Thus physicalists, who do not admit emergent 
properties within their ontology, can set out a principle of composition in purely 
physicalist terms. The issue for the physicalists, however, is whether they can provide a 
principle of composition in this way which is otherwise acceptable on ontological 
grounds. In Section 5 l say more about emergent properties and look in detail at van 
Inwagen’s, Jaworski’s and possible physicalist principles of composition. I suggest an 
argument on Jaworski’s behalf seeking to justify his hylomorphism on the basis that it 
provides ontological resources for a principle of composition that is preferable to any 
rival physicalist principles. 
Properties and predicates 
2.4 This brings us to the properties that may be recognised in the kind of 
compositional ontological framework that I am developing and the predicates that 
denote those properties. This is central to theories of the mind-body relation given that, 
within the context of the ontological framework that I am developing, such theories are 
concerned with the relation between mental and physical properties and the predicates 
that denote them. Predicates are part of our language, our conceptual schemes. I am 
assuming that a predicate truly applies to a particle or object in virtue of some property 
or properties that it instantiates. This does not imply an abundant view of properties, 
the view that there is a property corresponding to every predicate we can construct. 
Like many philosophers, Jaworski adopts a sparse view of properties. This view follows 
from what he calls the Eleatic Principle, the view that the only material objects that exist 
are ones that can enter into causal relations and the only properties that exist are ones 
that empower objects to enter into those relations .  As Jaworski points out, this has 10
the implication that properties do not correspond to predicates one to one, that not 
every predicate denotes a property, and different predicates may denote the same 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 30. He is not concerned with abstract objects and properties.10
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property . I will adopt these views of Jaworski’s on properties and predicates for the 11
purpose of developing the ontological framework and comparing Jaworski’s 
hylomorphism with the metaphysical theories of the physicalists. And I will refer to 
sparse properties when I need to emphasise that I am talking about ‘real’, causally 
efficacious, properties. 
2.5 A distinction relating to properties that will be relevant in what follows is the 
distinction between the levels and orders of properties, a distinction drawn, for 
example, by Kim .  A property’s level depends upon what level of object it 12
characterises . The basic properties that characterise the fundamental particles are at 13
the same level, the properties that characterise me are at the same level, and so on. At 
each level there may be a number of distinct properties. Some of the properties at the 
same level may be arranged hierarchically in orders whilst others may not. For 
example, if we treat ‘… is wearing blue jeans’ and ‘… is wearing a blue jumper’ as 
predicates that denote properties that characterise me independently of each other, 
then these are distinct first order properties at the same level with no hierarchy. In other 
cases, however, there may be a hierarchy of higher and lower order properties at the 
same level. This hierarchy can be expressed in terms of supervenience, with the higher 
order property supervening on the lower order property. Three points should be noted 
in relation to higher and lower order properties that will be relevant in the following 
discussion -
(1) By higher order property is not meant a property had by another property. In this 
context a higher order property is a property of an object.
(2) On one view higher order properties are not really properties at all. Jaworski 
describes such properties as logical constructions - “properties whose 
definitions quantify over other properties. If F1, F2 …, Fn are properties, we 
might define a property, H, by stipulating that something has H if and only if it 
has some F-property or other” . As Jaworski says, the Eleatic Principle implies 14
that these so-called properties do not exist. H is not a distinct higher order 
 The implications of the Eleatic Principle for the sparseness of properties depends on 11
the view of causation with which it is coupled. As will be seen below, Jaworski couples 
it with causal pluralism, which results in a less sparse view of properties than may first 
appear to be the case. 
 See, for example, Kim (1998), pp. 80 et seq.12
 The idea of levels of objects relates to the layered view of reality discussed later in 13
this Section. 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 88 (italics in original). 14
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property over and above the F-properties, rather ‘H’ is a higher order predicate 
that picks out the F-properties .15
(3) Insofar as supervenience is a relation between sets of properties it is potentially 
misleading to speak of higher order properties, construed as logical 
constructions, supervening on lower order properties. But if higher order 
properties are treated as properties that are distinct from lower order properties 
then the sense in which they are distinct is different from the sense in which, for 
example, the properties denoted by ‘… is wearing blue jeans’ and ‘… is wearing 
a blue jumper’ are distinct. Here Stoljar’s analysis of distinctness in terms of 
weak and strong modal distinctness is useful . Two properties F and G are 16
weakly modally distinct if and only if it is metaphysically possible that F is 
instantiated and G is not or it is metaphysically possible that G is instantiated 
and F is not, but not both. This will be the case where, for example, F is multiply 
realised by a set of lower level properties including G. F and G are strongly 
modally distinct if is metaphysically possible that F is instantiated and G is not 
and it is metaphysically possible the G is instantiated and F is not. Here neither 
of the properties supervene with metaphysical necessity on the other. They are 
contingently related, at most there is nomological supervenience based on 
contingent laws of nature . I will use ‘ontologically distinct’ in relation to 17
properties to mean distinctness generally, whether weak or strong modal 
distinctness. The alternative to two properties being ontologically distinct is thus 
being numerically identical. 
As will be apparent from this analysis of distinctness, a set of properties, P, supervenes 
upon another set of properties, P*, if no two things can differ with respect to their P 
properties without also differing with respect to their P* properties. The modal strength 
of a supervenience relation may be metaphysical or nomological depending on whether 
the necessary co-variation is a matter of metaphysical necessity or nomological 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 91. Jaworski refers with approval to Kim (see Kim (1998), p. 15
104). Kim, who advocates a sparse conception of properties, also says that it is clearer 
to refer to higher order predicates rather than higher order properties.
 See Stoljar (2008). 16
 There is potentially a third type of distinctness not covered by the above analysis. 17
This could be called minimally modally distinct, where two properties - F and G - are 
minimally modally distinct if and only if they are not numerically identical but it is not 
metaphysically possible that F is instantiated and G is not and it is not metaphysically 
possible that G is instantiated and F is not. Jaworski, for example, considers this type 
of distinctness in his discussion of necessitation dualism - see Jaworski (2016), p. 243. 
I will ignore minimal modal distinctness in what follows. 
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necessity, obtaining given specified laws of nature. Supervenience also comes in 
different varieties. Where relevant, when I refer to a supervenience relation I will 
specify its modal strength or variety, as I did when setting out the analysis of 
distinctness. 
2.6 There are different theories about the nature of properties. In addition to 
adopting a sparse view of properties, Jaworski treats properties as particulars (tropes) 
rather than universals . More importantly for present purposes, he adopts the identity 18
theory of powers according to which one and the same property can be described 
using a dispositional or non-dispositional vocabulary, the different vocabularies bringing 
out the different theoretical roles that the property can play. This contrasts with theories 
that treat a property as either dispositional or non-dispositional (categorical) but not 
both. The identity theory of powers will be important in Section 6 when I discuss the 
hard problem of consciousness. Jaworski’s theory of powers also provides that every 
property essentially empowers the objects that it characterises to enter into the same 
causal relations in every possible world. This means that for Jaworski laws of nature 
are metaphysically necessary, so that nomological necessity is a species of 
metaphysical necessity. Jaworski thus expresses the supervenience relations that 
figure in his hylomorphic theory in terms of metaphysical necessity .19
Explanatory and ontological pluralism 
2.7 I have said that the mind-body relation concerns the relation between mental 
and physical properties and the predicates that denote them. Central to explaining this 
relation is the distinction between explanatory levels and ontological levels. For the 
purpose of developing the ontological framework I will assume that an empirically 
adequate future physics will be able to exhaustively describe the basic level of the 
framework. Such a physics can be said to have an ontological commitment to the 
particles referred to by its singular terms and the basic properties denoted by its 
predicates. And we can be said to accept such particles and properties into our 
ontology when we accept physics and therefore its ontological commitments. This 
approach to ontological commitment is behind Jaworski’s ontological naturalism, which 
he describes as follows: “If our best empirical descriptions, explanations and methods 
posit entities of kind K, then that gives us good prima facie reason to think that Ks 
 See Jaworski (2016), chapter 3. 18
 Jaworski discusses these last two points in Jaworski (2016), chapter 4. 19
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exist” . Insofar as we have one conceptual scheme at the basic level, physics, with 20
one set of ontological commitments, we have, but only if we confine our attention to this 
level alone, explanatory and ontological monism. 
2.8 As the basic particles combine to form arrangements of increasing complexity 
we eventually have particles arranged molecule-wise. At this level we have another 
conceptual scheme, chemistry, resulting in explanatory pluralism. Explanatory pluralism 
gives rise to the following metaphysical question: 
Question Q: Are the two schemes just different ways of describing the 
ontologically basic level described by physics or does the second conceptual 
scheme have ontological commitments to properties or objects over and above 
those to which the first conceptual scheme, physics, is committed ? 21
In order to answer this question it is necessary to say what is meant by the reference to 
there being properties and objects ‘over and above’ those described by the first 
conceptual scheme. So far as properties are concerned I will understand this phrase in 
terms of ontological distinctness. Thus, in relation to chemistry, the question is whether 
at the relevant level of complexity we are committed to distinct molecular properties, 
that is, to sparse properties that are numerically distinct from the basic properties of 
physics . There is then the parallel question in relation to objects - are we committed 22
to numerically distinct (composite) objects, molecules, over and above the basic 
particles that compose them. Ontological pluralism may thus consist of property 
pluralism and/or object pluralism. The move from the explanatory pluralism associated 
with the special sciences to ontological pluralism is what generates the layered view of 
reality, where complex arrangements of basic particles are treated as composing 
atoms, with atomic properties denoted by the predicates of atomic physics, complex 
arrangements of atoms are treated as composing molecules, with the molecular 
properties of chemistry, and complex arrangements of molecules are treating as 
composing organisms, with properties denoted by the predicates of biology and, 
ultimately, psychology. Whether we are committed to higher level properties and 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 19.20
 As Kim says: “Metaphysics is the domain where different languages, theories, 21
explanations and conceptual systems come together and have their mutual ontological 
relations sorted out and clarified” - Kim (1998), p. 66. 
 This could be expressed in terms of truth makers: are chemical descriptions 22
containing chemical predicates made true by distinct chemical properties or only by 
properties denoted by the predicates of physics?
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objects will need to be informed by science but science alone cannot determine the 
answer. That will depend on the metaphysical framework within which the question is 
posed, in particular, on the principle of composition and view of properties that is part of 
the interpretation of that framework.
2.9 Property pluralism may be defined as follows:
Property pluralism: There are the basic properties of physics and sparse non-
basic properties, and the non-basic properties and basic properties are 
distinct .23
The reference to distinctness in this definition includes both strong and weak modal 
distinctness. On this reading property monism is the position that there are no sparse 
non-basic properties distinct from the basic properties of physics. Property pluralism 
thus requires what I referred to above as emergent properties. Whether property 
pluralism is necessary or sufficient for ontologically distinct objects over and above 
those at the basic level, object pluralism, will depend on the applicable principle of 
composition. An ontology that did not allow for ontologically distinct objects - object 
monism - would constitute mereological nihilism. I discuss these issues in Section 5.
The mental and the physical within the ontological framework 
2.10 The rest of this dissertation is essentially concerned with question Q so far as it 
concerns the relation between our psychological conceptual scheme, on the one hand, 
and physics on the other hand: Is our psychological conceptual scheme just a different 
way of describing the ontologically basic level described by physics or does psychology 
have ontological commitments to properties or objects over and above those to which 
physics is committed? Answering this question within the ontological framework that I 
have described will explain how minded creatures like us fit into a physical world. 
2.11 The classification of a property as mental or physical can be taken to depend on 
the classification of the predicates which denote it, and the classification of those 
predicates depends, in turn, on the classification of the conceptual scheme of which the 
predicates form part. The conceptual scheme relevant so far as the mind is concerned 
 This is a generalised version of Jaworski’s definition of property dualism, which 23
covers only the relation between mental and physical properties - see Jaworski (2016), 
p. 220. 
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is psychology, with its psychological predicates and properties. Chalmers distinguishes 
two broad conceptions of the mental, what he calls the psychological concept, using 
‘psychological’ in a narrower sense than I am using it, and the phenomenal 
concept .The psychological concept in Chalmers’ narrow sense is the mental as the 24
causal or explanatory basis for behaviour, as when we cite a person’s beliefs and 
desires to explain why they raise their arm. Jaworski refers to this as the public 
conception of the mental, with a focus on the notions of intentionality, mental 
representation, propositional content and rationality . The phenomenal concept of the 25
mental is the mental as conscious experience, the ‘something-it-is-likeness’. Jaworski 
refers to this as the private conception of the mental, with a focus on the notions of 
first-person authority, subjectivity, and phenomenal consciousness (qualia). Using 
these concepts, what it means for a mental property to be psychological is for it to play 
a particular causal or explanatory role, and what it means for a mental property to be 
phenomenal is for it to have a ‘what-it-is-likeness’, to feel a certain way. Some mental 
properties, such as pain, will have both a psychological and phenomenal aspect. When 
I speak of psychology as a conceptual scheme I intend this to cover our theories about 
mental properties generally. I will assume that the phenomenal and psychological 
aspects of the mental exhaust the mind and that an adequate theory of the mind-body 
relation should deal with both aspects.  
2.12 In parallel with the approach taken in relation to mental properties, the 
reference to physical properties should be construed as referring to the properties 
denoted by predicates in our physical conceptual scheme. The reference to our 
physical conceptual scheme is, however, ambiguous. In addition to physics we have 
special sciences like chemistry and biology. If we restrict the reference to our physical 
conceptual scheme to physics then the physical properties are the properties denoted 
by the predicates of physics, the basic properties. If we widen the reference to the 
physical special sciences then the reference to physical properties potentially includes 
distinct chemical and biological properties as well. Which approach is taken will affect 
what it means for a physicalist to say that there are no mental properties over and 
above the physical properties. 
 See Chalmers (1996), chapter 1. 24
 See Jaworski (2011), chapter 2. 25
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3. PHYSICALISM 
3.1 In the first part of this Section I set out the physicalist interpretation of the 
ontological framework outlined in Section 2. This will result in a more austere ontology 
than Jaworski’s hylomorphism, which will be described in Section 4. The challenge for 
the physicalists is to develop an acceptable theory of the mind-body relation within the 
confines of this austere ontology. In the second part of this Section I consider the 
general strategies available to the physicalists when developing their mind-body 
theories. 
Physicalist worldview 
3.2 In the ontological framework described in Section 2 everything is physical in the 
sense that it is either a basic particle characterised by basic properties or an object 
composed exclusively of basic particles. This is not enough, however, to guarantee that 
all of the properties within the framework are basic properties. Without further 
restrictions a composite object may still be characterised by chemical, biological or 
mental properties that are ontologically distinct from the basic properties. On some 
definitions of physicalism, theories that include special science properties that are only 
weakly modally distinct from basic physical properties are still classified as physicalist 
theories. Physicalism is only taken to rule out strongly modally distinct special science 
properties. Kim refers to this type of physicalism as ‘minimal physicalism’, representing 
the idea that there are no free-floating (that is, strongly modally distinct) mental 
properties unanchored in the physical world, as is the case with extreme forms of 
dualism, such as Cartesian dualism . 26
3.3 For Jaworski, however, physicalism requires the rejection of any form of 
property pluralism . I will adopt Jaworski’s definition of physicalism. This will be useful 27
when comparing physicalism, as so understood, with Jaworski’s hylomorphism. On 
Jaworski’s definition, physicalism treats all properties as either basic properties or 
properties that can be identified with basic properties. Given the assumption that an 
empirically adequate future physics will be able to exhaustively describe the basic 
level, this results in what Jaworski calls the core thesis of physicalism, the claim that 
“everything can be exhaustively described and explained by the most empirically 
 See Kim (1998), p.15. 26
 See Jaworski (2016), chapter 11. 27
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adequate theories in current or future physics” . It is, however, implicit in the 28
classification of properties according to the predicates that denote them that being 
mental (or chemical or biological) and being physical are not mutually exclusive 
designations. So physicalism as construed by Jaworski is compatible with mental (or 
chemical or biological) predicates truly applying to composite objects in our ontology, 
but only in virtue of those objects instantiating the basic properties of physics. This 
means that Jaworski’s definition of physicalism complies with his second requirement 
for such a definition (in addition to the requirement to comply with the core thesis), 
namely that the definition must be compatible with the different versions of physicalism:  
eliminativism, reductivism, and non-reductivism .29
3.4 Jaworski illustrates the physicalist position using an imaginary character, the 
super physicist . The super physicist is said to posses complete knowledge of the 30
fundamental physical materials but to lack the conceptual resources of the special 
sciences. From the super physicist’s standpoint, says Jaworski, there is just a 
continuous curtain of fundamental physical particles or stuff. And, Jaworski says:
“If physicalism is true … the super physicist’s description misses out nothing. 
Since everything can be exhaustively described and explained by physics, the 
super physicist’s descriptions of the universe are complete as they stand. If you 
and I describe the universe in ways that recognise the distinctions between 
living things and nonliving ones, or mental beings and nonmental ones, that is a 
comment not necessarily about what the universe contains, but about how we 
go about describing it.”31
So on this view, all that exists are the basic particles characterised by the basic 
properties, behaving in accordance with the laws of physics. I will assume that these 
laws apply to the behaviour of the basic particles in the same way, whether the 
particles are relatively isolated or part of a complex arrangement of particles, such as 
an arrangement constituting an organism. I will also assume that the laws provide for 
physical causal closure. The principle of causal closure can be formulated in different 
ways but, for present purposes, it can be taken to be the principle that all physical 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 224. 28
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 221.29
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 10. 30
 Jaworski (2016), p. 10. 31
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effects have a sufficient physical cause . Given these assumptions, the super physicist 32
could follow the progress of an individual basic particle throughout its history, as it 
joined and left arrangements of particles of varying complexity, without needing to have 
recourse to anything other than the laws of physics to describe its behaviour. And, in 
theory, the super physicalist could follow the progress of every basic particle in this 
way. Note, however, that although Jaworski introduces the super physicist as both an 
explanatory and ontological monist there is no need for the super physicist to be so 
conceptually impoverished in order to represent the physicalist position (as is clear 
from Jaworski’s second requirement for a definition of physicalism). The super physicist 
can describe the world using the conceptual resources of the special sciences. It’s just 
that, in doing so, the super physicist does not accept any ontological commitments over 
and above those of physics. The super physicist is a property monist but not 
necessarily an explanatory monist (or, indeed, an object monist - see Section 5). The 
claim that everything can be exhaustively described by physics is an ontological claim. 
It does not imply that there are not additional conceptual schemes providing alternative 
ways of describing this physicalist reality. Thus the physicalist answer to question Q 
above is: insofar as there are additional conceptual schemes they are just different 
ways of describing the ontologically basic level described by physics.  
Physicalist theories of the mind-body relation 
3.5 If everything can be exhaustively described by physics then the issue for the 
physicalist seeking to account for the place of the mind within a physical world is 
whether psychology also has some descriptive legitimacy. The most that psychology 
can hope for is that it is a different but legitimate way of describing the ontological facts 
described by physics. I will not consider in any detail the different versions of 
physicalism or the well developed criticisms of them. And I will not consider 
eliminativism as a physicalist option. My concern in this Section will be to consider the 
two general strategies available to reductive and non-reductive physicalists when 
developing their mind-body theories, and the possible shortcomings in the physicalist 
theories that can be seen as motivating non-physicalist mind-body theories like 
Jaworski’s. 
 On different formulations of the principle of causal closure and their implications for 32
mind-body theories, see Lowe (2008), chapter 2. 
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The physicalists’ first strategy: numerical identity
3.6 The first physicalist strategy is to posit a numerical identity between the 
properties denoted by psychological predicates and the properties denoted by the 
predicates of physics so that the two sets of predicates are just two different ways of 
referring to the same properties. The reductive physicalist of the type-type variety 
proposes identities of the M = P variety, where M is a type of mental property and P a 
type of physical property. This is supposed to be analogous with examples like the 
identification of water with H2O. But what are the physical properties that are meant to 
be numerically identical with our beliefs and desires, pains and pleasures? The initial 
reduction may identify our mental properties with high level neural properties, which in 
turn will be identified with molecular properties and so on down to the fundamental 
level of physics. Given the transitivity of identity, the result is that our mental properties 
will be identified with an extremely complex arrangement of a sub-set of the basic 
particles that compose us (perhaps the particles composing our nervous system) and 
their properties and relations. This arrangement can be considered in terms of Kim’s 
concept of a micro-structural property, which Kim himself uses to try and effect 
reductions between properties at the same level . In the water and H2O case we have 33
two predicates characterising a molecule, ‘… is a water molecule’ and ‘… is H2O’. To 
explain how these two predicates designated the same property, so that water = H2O, 
we say that the property of being a water molecule, designated by the first predicate, is 
identical with a micro-structural property identified by the second predicate consisting 
of the water molecule’s proper parts and their properties and relations. The micro-
structural property can be represented as R(P1(H1), P1(H2), P2 (O1)), where H1 and 
H2 are the two hydrogen atoms, O1 the oxygen atom, P1 and P2 properties 
characterising hydrogen and oxygen atoms, respectively, and R the bonding relation 
between the molecules. Water = H2O can then be analysed as the property of being 
water = the micro-structural property R(P1(H1), P1(H2), P2 (O1)). Using this approach, 
the type-type physicalist can seek to identify, for example, my belief that it is raining, a 
mental property, with a presumably immensely complicated micro-structural property of 
me consisting of a sub-set of my basic particles standing in a network of relations with 
each other.
3.7 How are such reductions to be effected? The identity of water = H2O was 
presumably discovered because both the properties of being water and being H2O 
were independently identifiable and could then be identified as one and the same 
 See Kim (1998), pp. 83-84.33
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property in the same way as Hesperus was identified with Phosphorus. Identities of the 
M = P variety will not be like this insofar as the micro-structural property that I am 
taking P to be is a gerrymandered property, where to be a gerrymandered property is to 
be a property that is only identifiable as the realiser of some other property . If P is a 34
gerrymandered property it won’t be the case that a natural scientist who has been 
studying P as part of a scientific project comes to identify it as exactly the same 
property as, for example, the belief that it is raining. Kim argues that mental properties 
are reducible to physical properties just insofar as mental properties can be interpreted 
as functional properties in terms of their causal role. For example, the property of 
having a belief would be interpreted in terms of the inputs that give rise to its 
instantiation and the behavioural outputs that characteristically flow from its 
instantiation. This interpretation then allows the functionalised mental property to be 
identified with its physical realiser, that is, the physical property that fits the causal role. 
Kim says: “That a property is functionalisable - that is, it can be defined in terms of its 
causal role - is necessary and sufficient for functional reducibility” . Type-type property 35
identifications are usually taken to be blocked by the multiple realisation argument. If 
mental property M is realised by two physical realisers, P* and P**, then, so the 
multiple realisation argument goes, M cannot be identified with either P* or P**. There 
are, however, two ways that a physicalist pursuing the numerical identity strategy can 
respond to this argument. First, the reductivist could propose two property types, M* 
and M**, and the reductions M* = P* and M** = P**. Secondly, the reductivist could 
follow Heil and Robb and propose token-token identifications rather than type-type 
identifications . The multiple realisation argument assumes that properties are 36
universals, blocking the identification of M with either P* or P**. But if properties are 
treated as particulars or tropes, then each particular instantiation of M can be identified 
with a particular instantiation of P* or P**. 
3.8 One motivation behind the numerical identity strategy may be to preserve the 
reality of mental properties. The physicalist ontology implies that all sparse properties 
are physical properties. So if mental properties are also to be sparse properties they 
must be numerically identical with physical properties. But even if one accepts that 
such identifications would result in the reality of mental properties there are problems 
with the numerical identity strategy. I am assuming that the mental has both 
 Fodor refers to gerrymandered properties in this sense in Fodor (1997). 34
 Kim (2005), p. 165. 35
 See Heil and Robb (2003). 36
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phenomenal and psychological aspects. An identity theorist has problems with both 
aspects. On the phenomenal side, if we rely on being able to functionalise mental 
properties to effect their reduction then, as Kim admits, the phenomenal aspects of the 
mental are physically irreducible and “Qualia, therefore, are the ‘mental residue’ that 
cannot be accommodated within the physical domain” . On the psychological side, 37
mental properties like belief and desire (the propositional attitudes) have distinctive 
identity or attribution conditions that arguably block their identification with physical 
properties. Child argues against such identifications on the basis of the uncodifiability 
of the rational . Child argues that propositional attitudes form a rational web that is in 38
principle uncodifiable whereas physical states form a causal web that is in principle 
codifiable. It is therefore not possible, Child argues, to make detailed correlations, let 
alone identifications, between propositional attitudes and physical phenomena. A 
similar type of argument against the identification of mental and physical properties can 
be made on externalist (twin earth) grounds. The contents of a mental property like a 
belief, and thus its identity conditions, is dependent on the believer’s social and 
environmental circumstances. A belief about water on earth, for example, will be about 
H2O whereas a belief about water on twin earth, where the watery stuff is XYZ, will be 
about XYZ. If Jon has belief M about water on earth, and thus about H2O, and M is 
identified with physical property P, then his physical replica on twin earth will also 
instantiate P but will not instantiate M because the replica does not have a belief about 
H2O. So M cannot be identified with P. 
The physicalists’ second strategy: explanatory relevance  
3.9 The second physicalist strategy is to abandon the attempt to identify mental 
properties with sparse physical properties. One type of non-reductivist physicalist, for 
example, treats psychology as providing an abstract description of the world described 
by physics and the other natural sciences. Thus, faced with the multiple realisation 
argument, instead of seeking to preserve numerical identities between mental property 
M and its multiple physical realisers they treat the relation between M and its realisers 
as a relation between higher and lower order properties. As explained in Section 2, M is 
thus treated as a logical construction quantifying over its realisers. Realisation is 
treated as a relation between abstract, higher order, predicates and sparse physical 
 Kim (2005), p. 170. I discuss how a physicalist may seek to respond to the hard 37
problem of qualia in Section 6. 
 See Child (1994), chapter 2. As Child acknowledges, the uncodifiability argument is a 38
development of Davidson’s argument for the anomalism of the mental - see, for 
example, Davidson (1974). 
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properties. The purpose of predicate ‘M’ is to allow us to take a broader brush 
approach to distinctions than that taken by the physical sciences in order to satisfy our 
different explanatory interests. But because such non-reductive physicalists still posit 
an isomorphism between the predicates and properties of the physical sciences and 
those of psychology, with mental predicates defined as quantifying over physical states, 
they arguably face the same problems as the identity theorists in relation to 
psychological properties (arising from the uncodifiability of the rational and 
externalism). And they will also struggle to account for the phenomenal aspect of the 
mental. 
3.10 What I will call the relaxed physicalists move away from positing any systematic 
correlations between the properties denoted by the predicates of physics and those of 
psychology. They propose a relaxed view of the relation between the mental and the 
physical that seeks at the same time to preserve the causal relevance of psychological 
properties and their use in causal explanations of actions. On this strategy, 
psychological causal explanations must in some way relate to the causal goings on at 
the basic physical level but the “physical story will have its own shape and its own sort 
of complexity, and there will be no systematic correlation at all between elements in the 
[psychological and physical] stories … ” . Relaxed physicalists move away from 39
positing a realisation relation between the mental and the physical to a looser, 
supervenience relation. This type of account requires distinguishing between sparse, 
causally efficacious, properties and properties that although not sparse are 
nevertheless causally relevant. Psychological properties are treated as causally 
relevant properties even though they are not, on this view, causally efficacious 
properties insofar as they occur in explanations of why something happened and 
satisfy certain other conditions. In Child’s account psychological properties are casually 
relevant insofar as they play a role in a model of causal explanation, figure in 
counterfactuals and are connected in regular ways to their object’s underlying causal 
powers . Such properties are ascribed to a person on the basis of their behavioural 40
patterns, which depend on the person’s behavioural dispositions. These behavioural 
dispositions in turn will be associated in regular ways with their bodily movements, 
which are assumed to be determined by the person’s physical composition, ultimately, 
their constituent basic particles and their properties and relations. This approach to 
psychological properties is compatible with the uncodifiability of the rational and with 
externalist concerns. We ascribe psychological properties to a person in order to make 
 Child (1994), p. 113.39
 See Child (1994), chapter 6.40
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the best sense of a person’s behaviour and so the norms of rationality are incorporated 
into our ascriptive practices. And our ascriptive practices take into account not only a 
subject’s behaviour but also the social and environmental context in which they act. 
This approach also explains why the psychological supervenes on the physical and 
why psychological properties are casually relevant. A difference in the psychological 
properties that we ascribed to a person would require a difference in their behaviour or 
their context and, in either case, this will require a physical difference. And, if the 
context is held fixed, the ascription of a particular psychological property will reflect a 
person’s physical constitution and thus explain (albeit indirectly) why something, the 
person’s action, occurred. 
3.11 As Child acknowledges, similar accounts have been given by other writers, 
such as Jackson and Pettit . Jackson and Pettit also argue that a property can be 41
causally relevant even if it is not casually efficacious. On their analysis a property, P, 
can be causally relevant in relation to an event if P’s instantiation ensures that the 
relevant causally efficacious properties in the causal process leading up to the event 
are instantiated, even if P itself is not a causally efficacious property in that process. In 
their opinion this explains the causal relevance of higher-order properties cited in 
special science explanations, such as psychological explanations citing psychological 
properties. Kim, a proponent of the numerical identity strategy, criticises Jackson and 
Pettit’s account . On Kim’s view, any account of psychological causal explanation 42
worth having must provide for a causal relation between the psychological property 
cited in the explanation and the action being explained. Jackson and Pettit do not 
provide such an account because on their account, says Kim, “the ‘because’ in ‘Doreen 
winced because she felt a sharp pain in her elbow’ cannot be read as invoking a causal 
relation between Doreen’s pain and her wincing” . According to Kim, a plausible 43
account of causal explanation must do justice to the “because” in such explanations 
and, for Kim, this requires the explanation to cite causally efficacious sparse properties. 
The same criticism could be applied to Child’s account. 
 See Child (1994), p. 192. The reference to Jackson and Pettit is to Jackson and 41
Pettit (1990). 
 See Kim (1998), pp. 72 et seq. 42
 Kim (1998), p. 75. 43
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The motivation for a non-physicalist mind-body theory
3.12 Kim’s criticism of the explanatory relevance approach to mental properties 
sums up the difference between the two physicalist strategies and their consequences 
for physicalist mind-body theories. The identity strategy can potentially provide a realist 
account of mental properties, where such properties are treated as sparse properties. 
Arguably, however, such an account cannot do justice to the distinctive nature of 
psychological properties and their role in psychological explanations of actions. The 
explanatory relevance strategy takes account of this distinctive nature and explanatory 
role but only at the cost of rendering psychological properties merely explanatory. And 
both strategies seem to struggle to account for the phenomenal aspects of the mind (a 
point that I will return to in Section 6). These deficiencies provide a motivation for 
attempting to develop a non-physicalist theory of the mind-body relation that combines 
the advantages of the physicalist theories without their disadvantages. Jaworski’s 
theory can be seen as one such attempt. He purports to develop a theory that provides 
the ontological resources required to develop a realist account of the mental whilst, at 
the same time, taking full account of our explanatory practices and the distinctive 
nature of the propositional attitudes. 
4. JAWORSKI’S HYLOMORPHISM 
4.1 What distinguishes Jaworski from the physicalists is his move from explanatory 
pluralism to ontological pluralism. In this Section I describe how this move grounds 
Jaworski’s hylomorphic worldview and enables him to provide a distinctive theory of the 
mind-body relation. In Section 5 I then consider whether this move is justified. 
The hylomorphic worldview
4.2 Jaworski is a property pluralist. Above the basic level of physics the world 
instantiates higher level hylomorphic structures. Jaworski states that “Hylomorphism 
claims that structure (or organisation, form, arrangement, order, or configuration) is a 
basic ontological and explanatory principle. Some individuals, paradigmatically living 
things, consist of materials that are structured or organised in various ways.” . Even a 44
physicalist can accept the importance of structure, that what distinguishes a living thing 
from an inanimate object is how its constitutive basic particles are arranged. What is 
distinctive about Jaworski’s hylomorphism is the ontological status of the structures 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 8. 44
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described by the special sciences. Jaworski is a realist about such structures, this is 
what it means to describe structure as a basic ontological as well as explanatory 
principle. So Jaworski’s  answer to question Q set out in Section 2 is: the conceptual 
schemes of the special sciences have ontological commitments over and above the 
ontological commitments of physics, namely their commitment to hylomorphic 
structures.
Realist and non-realist approaches to structure
4.3 Jaworski contrasts his realist approach to structure to the non-realist 
approaches to structure of the physicalists . One way that Jaworski illustrates this 45
distinction is by using a squashing example . If a human being is put in a strong bag to 46
ensure that nothing leaks out and squashed there will be a change in the properties 
and behaviour of the bagged physical materials before and after squashing. Before the 
squashing the bag includes a human being with the power to think, feel and act. After 
the squashing the bag includes mush that cannot do any of these things (although it 
retains some of its properties, such as its mass). Jaworski says that what has changed 
is the way the physical materials are structured and that the pre-squashing structure 
was responsible, in part at least, for their being a human being with the relevant 
powers. The physicalists can agree that structure is the decisive thing in such 
squashing examples. Where they disagree with Jaworski is on the ontological 
significance of the structure. For the physicalist, before the squashing the basic 
particles composing the victim have a physical structure, what I will call their 
microphysical structure. This structure consists of the types of relations that can obtain 
between the basic particles and that can be exhaustively described by physics. It is 
structure as so understood that forms the basis of the physicalist account of the 
difference between the pre-squashing and post-squashing properties and behaviour of 
the physical materials in the bag. For the physicalists this is all there is to structure and 
references in the special sciences to structures should not be taken to refer to anything 
ontologically distinct from microphysical structures. Jaworski describes this as a non-
realist approach to structure.
4.4 On Jaworski’s hylomorphic account there is more to structure than this. On the 
way into the bag in the squashing example there is a hylomorphically structured 
individual. The hylomorphic structures the individual instantiates are modally correlated 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 20. 45
 See Jaworski (2016), p.9.46
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with the microphysical structure of the basic particles but are nevertheless ontologically 
distinct (weakly modally distinct) from the microphysical structure. It is this distinct 
hylomorphic structure that explains the composition and powers of the human being on 
the way into the bag and it is the break down of this structure as a result of the 
squashing that explains why there is no longer a human being in the bag with the 
power to think, feel and act. This is Jaworski’s realist approach to structure. According 
to Jaworsk the descriptive powers of physics are insufficient to exhaustively describe 
the behaviour of composite substances, paradigmatically the behaviour of living things 
like us, even though physics can exhaustively describe the behaviour of our 
constitutive basic particles. To describe the behaviour of composite substances 
recourse must also be had to the descriptive resources of special sciences, like biology 
and psychology, with their references to structure. And Jaworski’s ontological 
naturalism requires him to treat these references to structures with ontological 
seriousness. He thus claims that the structures posited by the special sciences are real 
properties of composite objects, ontologically distinct from the properties posited by 
physics. That the structures are properties follows from Jaworski’s substance-property 
metaphysics. The structures must be either substances or properties and Jaworski 
says that their theoretical roles correspond to those of properties .47
Causal pluralism as the basis of Jaworski’s structural realism
4.5 If, as Jaworski claims, hylomorphic structures are higher level sparse properties 
they must comply with his metaphysical theory of properties . In particular, they will 48
confer causal powers on their composite bearers distinct from the causal powers 
manifested at the basic level and described by physics. This raises the question of how 
these distinct higher level powers relate to the lower level basic powers. Whilst 
Jaworski claims that his hylomorphic structures are sparse higher level properties, he 
also wants his hylomorphic theory to be consistent with the laws of physics, including 
causal closure . Combining his distinct higher level hylomorphic structures with lower 49
level causal closure requires him to take a position on the nature of causation. 
4.6 An instance of causation can be regarded as a relation between events in the 
world, treated in the ontological framework as property instantiations. There are 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 94. 47
 As Jaworski acknowledges - see Jaworski (2016), p. 94.48
 Thus he says that hylomorphists “are committed to the idea that higher-level 49
behaviour never violates lower-level physical laws” - Jaworski (2016), p. 280.  
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different accounts of the nature of this relation, which tend to divide roughly into two 
kinds. There are accounts that understand the relation as a process involving the 
transfer of some sort of quantity, such as energy, from cause to effect, and accounts in 
terms of regularity or probability, where the cause makes the effect more likely. 
Counterfactual accounts, for example, are of the second kind. I will call the view that 
there is only one kind of causal relation in the world causal monism and the view that 
there is more than one kind of causal relation causal pluralism. A theorist could be a 
causal pluralist because, for example, they combined a process account with a 
regularity or probability account but, as will be seen below, this is not the only way of 
being a causal pluralism. In addition to this distinction, there are different views on the 
levels at which instances of causation occur, with the physicalists, on the view I am 
taking of physicalism, being property monists and holding that causal relations 
occurred only at the basic level of physics (level monism) and non-physicalists being 
property pluralists and holding that causal relations occur at more than one level (level 
pluralism).
4.7 Causal monism comes in different varieties. One variety of causal monism 
holds that the only kind of causal relation is that described by physics - narrow causal 
monism. This is the view of the physicalists . Adding the physicalist requirement for 50
causal closure results in level monism . Another variety of causal monism is wide 51
causal monism. Fodor can be treated as a representative of this view. In Fodor (1990) 
Fodor assumes that singular causal statements need to be covered by causal laws: If 
event e1 causes event e2, then there are properties F and G, such that e1 instantiates 
F and e2 instantiates G and “F instantiations are sufficient for G instantiations” is a 
causal law. In such a case properties F and G are causally responsible properties.The 
laws of physics are strict causal laws, where satisfaction of the law’s antecedent is 
nomologically sufficient for the satisfaction of its consequent. The laws of the special 
sciences are hedged, ceteris paribus laws. The properties cited in special science laws 
are, according to Fodor, causally responsible even though the laws are hedged. What 
distinguishes the two types of law is that in the case of ceteris paribus laws there is 
always an implementing mechanism in virtue of which the satisfaction of the 
 Physicalism is compatible with either a process or regularity or probability view of 50
causation. Physicalism may seem to go naturally with a process view but Davidson, for 
example, can be viewed as a narrow causal monist because his regularity view 
requires strict causal laws. 
 Without causal closure narrow causal monism would be compatible with emergence 51
and level pluralism, where the higher level emergent powers operate like the powers 
described by physics.  
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antecedent brings about the satisfaction of the consequent. Fodor’s position is an 
example of a causal monist theory that combines (wide) causal monism with level 
pluralism, and level pluralism with lower level causal closure .52
4.8 Jaworski combines causal pluralism with level pluralism, and this is how he 
combines his higher level hylomorphic structures with lower level causal closure. He 
argues that the properties (hylomorphic structures) posited by the special sciences are 
causally efficacious but in a different way from the properties posited by physics. Like 
any causal pluralist, Jaworski holds that that there is more than one kind of causal 
relation but he does not describe this in terms of a combination of process and 
regularity or probability accounts of causation. His causal pluralism is instead based on 
his understanding of the relation between explanation and causation. Jaworski says 
that “… explanations in general map onto causes, and different kinds of explanations 
map onto different kinds of causes” . Jaworski explains that the different kinds of 53
explanations can be catalogued by reference to the logic of the why- and how- 
questions that illicit them . A why- or how- question is said to contain the logical form 54
of its answer, which will determine the range of things that count as explanations, in 
particular, whether the explanations should be given using the conceptual resources of 
physics or one of the special sciences. And, says Jaworski, “knowing what kinds of 
things count as explanations can reveal in turn the kinds of explanatory factors and 
relations that exist in the world” . This can be seen as part of Jaworski’s ontological 55
naturalism. It is this naturalism that requires him to treat the references to structures in 
the special sciences with ontological seriousness. This, in turn, given his ontological 
assumptions, requires him to treat such structures as sparse properties. Jaworski is 
now adding that the explanations in the special sciences carry with them not only an 
 Kim challenges Fodor’s account of the causal responsibility of special science 52
properties - see Kim (1998), pp. 50-51. He accepts that special science laws of the 
form ‘F instantiations are sufficient for G instantiations”, where F and G are special 
science properties, may support counterfactuals. He questions, however, whether such 
special science laws are causal laws in their own right, laws of the form “F-events, in 
virtue of being instantiations of property F, cause G-events”. The challenge is that 
figuring in a counterfactual supporting law is not sufficient to make a property causally 
efficacious. The question is what makes the counterfactual supporting law true - what is 
the truth maker. And the truth maker may be a microphysical property, such as the 
microphysical properties responsible for Fodor’s implementing mechanisms. Kim would 
no doubt criticise Jaworski’s causal pluralism in the same way. I take up this kind of 
challenge to Jaworski’s causal pluralism in Section 5. 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 292. 53
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 201 et seq. 54
 Jaworski (2016), p. 201. 55
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ontological commitment to distinct hylomorphic structures but also to different kinds of 
causation associated with these structures. And it is because the different levels of 
structures - biological, psychological, etc - are said to be causal in a different way from, 
and so not to compete with, the powers conferred by the basic properties of physics, 
that Jaworski claims to be able to reconcile his higher level sparse properties with 
lower level causal closure. From the super physicist’s point of view, the hylomorphic 
structures do not make a difference to the way that the basic particles composing a 
structured whole behave.
4.9 Jaworski’s move from explanatory pluralism to causal pluralism is controversial. 
In the rest of this part of this Section I will explain Jaworski’s causal pluralism in more 
detail. In Section 5 I will then consider criticisms of Jaworski’s causal pluralism, and the 
structural realism that he posits on the basis of it, and suggest a way of justifying his 
ontological position. To illustrate Jaworski’s causal pluralism I will use the example of 
Jon raising his arm as he walks down a city street in order to catch a taxi. This gives 
rise to the question : 56
(1) Why did Jon raise his arm?
There will be a number of ways of interpreting this why-question depending on the 
context. The most natural interpretation is to understand it as asking for Jon’s reason 
for raising his arm (in contrast, for example, to just carrying on down the street). The 
following explanation would, on this interpretation, fall within the permitted range of 
replies: 
(2) Jon raised his arm because he desired to catch a taxi and believed that this 
action would achieve the desired result. 
Arguably this can then be reformulated as:
 I am assuming that all parties to the current debate, physicalists and non-physicalists 56
like Jaworski, accept that when someone asks this question they are calling for a 
causal explanation, that is, an explanation of why something happened. See Child 
(1994), chapter 3, for an argument that the explanation of the occurrence of an event 
must be causal and that an action explanation explains the occurrence of an event.
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(3) Jon’s raising his arm was caused by his desire to catch a taxi and his belief 
that his action would achieve this desired result . 57
Jaworski explains the reformulation on the basis that the psychological explanation 
given in (2) maps onto a particular kind of causal factor, so that the explanation can be 
reformulated as a causal sentence along the lines of (3) without loss of meaning . (2) 58
asserts an explanatory relation between explanatory factors; the fact that Jon wanted 
to catch a taxi and believed that this could be achieved by raising his arm explains why 
he raised his arm. In accordance with Jaworski’s causal pluralism, (3) reformulates this 
statement in terms of a causal relation between causal factors, a causal relation in the 
world. So it seems that for Jaworski an explanatory factor is a causal factor is a cause. 
A different why-question may have determined a different range of possible 
explanations. Thus a neurologist monitoring Jon’s brain in order to map its functions 
may have asked why Jon raised his arm (in contrast to his foot) and receive the 
following explanation: 
(4) Jon raised his arm because neural fibres NF fired.
This could then be reformulated as: 
(5) Jon’s raising his arm was caused by neural fibres NF firing .59
(4) refers to a different kind of explanatory relation between different explanatory 
factors, using the conceptual resources of neurology not psychology. And the 
reformulation in (5) sets this out in terms of the different kinds of causal relation and 
causal factors operating at the neurological level and mapped onto by the neurological 
 This type of reformulation is controversial. We saw in Section 3 that Kim thought that 57
the possibility of such a reformulation was required to do justice to the “because” in 
causal explanations like statement (2). In an account like Jackson and Pettit’s such a 
reformulation is only acceptable insofar as it can be interpreted as asserting a causal 
relation between the underlying causally efficacious properties, the instantiation of 
which are ensured by the instantiation of the psychological properties cited in (2). 
 See Jaworwki (2011), p. 291 on this reformulation point. 58
 More accurately, the neurologist is asking why the bodily movement occurred and it 59
is the bodily movement, as opposed to Jon’s action, that is explained by the neural 
fibres firing. This distinction is relevant to Jaworski’s account of mental causation 
discussed in Section 6. 
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explanation .  Alternatively an explanation in terms of neural fibres NF firing could be 60
elicited by what Jaworski calls a how-question of mechanism, which asks how a 
system is able to perform an activity, where the logical form of the question calls for an 
explanation in terms of the how the sub-systems or parts of the system contribute to 
the activity . 61
4.10 Jaworski compares his approach to Aristotle’s account of causation and 
explanation and the doctrine of four causes . Different kinds of Aristotelian why-62
question may require an explanation in terms of four different kinds of explanatory 
factor, corresponding to different kinds of causation: (i) the structure of things - their 
forms; (ii) the materials that get structured - their matter; (iii) what is responsible for 
bringing about the structuring of the matter - the efficient cause; (iv) what the 
structuring is for - the end. Jaworski says that “Answers to these different questions 
highlight different types of explanatory factors or causes, and various senses of 
‘because’ express the various ways that those causes contribute to explaining the 
occurrence or phenomenon in question” . Despite its classical pedigree, however, this 63
move from explanation and explanatory factors to causation and causal factors or 
causes may still be questioned. Physicalists would presumably argue that when used 
to refer to instances of causation, regarded as a relation between events in the world, 
“cause” should be used in a narrower sense approximating to Aristotle’s efficient cause. 
And that it is in this narrower sense that questions concerning the ontological status of 
mental properties and mental causation are to be understood. 
Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation  
4.11 Jaworski uses his hylomorphic theory of structure to provide a theory of the 
mind-body relation. He expresses this with the slogan:
Structure minds: it provides us with resources for understanding the place of 
mental phenomena within the natural world . 64
 See Jaworski’s Madeleine example in Jaworski (2016) at pp. 204-205 for a similar 60
point. 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 203. 61
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 206. 62
 Jaworski (2016), p. 206. 63
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 18.64
 32
Jaworski distinguishes two types of structures, individual-making structure and activity-
making structure, and uses these structures to explain how minded-creatures like us fit 
into a natural world of the kind modelled by the compositional ontological framework 
that I developed in Section 2 . If we stay with the example of Jon and his arm raising, 65
the question that Jaworski’s hylomorphic mind-body theory needs to address is how 
Jon and his arm raising fit into this compositional ontology. The answer comes in two 
parts. The first part shows how Jon fits in and relies on individual-making structures. 
Individual-making structures make structured individuals what they are. They account 
for the unity and persistence of structured individuals, despite the constant influx and 
efflux of physical materials that compose them, and provide the ontological resources 
for Jaworski’s principle of composition (discussed in Section 5). This unity and 
persistence is imposed on such materials by each structured individual. It is the power 
that Jon has, for example, to organise or configure human-wise (Jon-wise) the 
materials that compose him . Whilst Jon exercises his power to configure the 66
materials that compose him human-wise he constitutes an ontologically distinct 
composite object existing over and above those materials. When he ceases to organise 
or configure the materials in this way he ceases to exist. The second part of Jaworski’s 
answer shows how Jon’s arm raising action fits in to the compositional ontology and 
relies on activity-making structures. Once Jon is on the ontological scene it is his 
activity-making structures that make activities, like his arm raising, what they are by 
coordinating the manifestations of the powers of his relevant proper parts. The 
materials that compose Jon will have powers by virtue of the properties they 
instantiate, whether as basic particles or as complex arrangements of such particles 
forming his functional parts, such as his brain, heart, muscles and sinews. For Jon to 
raise his arm some of his functional parts must manifest their powers arm-raising-wise. 
Jon manifests his power to impose an arm-raising structure on the way his functional 
parts manifest their powers, bringing this new arm-raising activity of Jon’s into 
existence . In this way he coordinates the way his parts manifest their powers, unifying 67
the diverse physiological events into a single act of arm-raising. 
 See Jaworski (2016), chapters 6 and 8, for his account of individual-making structure 65
and activity-making structure.
 Jaworski says that “Configuring materials and being composed of materials are co-66
foundational concepts on the hylomorphic view” - Jaworski (2016), p. 104.
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 155 et seq. 67
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4.12 One consequence of this view of activity composition is that the powers of a 
composite object like Jon are essentially embodied. Jon only has the power to raise his 
arm in virtue of his relevant functional parts having their powers. And what can be said 
of this arm raising action, says Jaworski, can equally be said of all of Jon’s mental 
activities: 
“If all our capacities are essentially embodied, hylomorphism implies that 
thinking, feeling, perceiving, intentionally acting, and other activities that 
philosophers typically categorise as mental or psychological are all structured 
manifestations of powers … The coordinated manifestation of those powers 
composes my thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and actions.” .68
One of the virtues that Jaworski claims for his mind-body theory is that it situates the 
mind-body relation within a broader metaphysical framework . Above the fundamental 69
level of basic particles hylomorphic structure predominates. These structures are 
essentially embodied in the basic materials. As we have seen, Jon and his behaviour 
can be described in a number of different ways drawing on the conceptual resources of 
one or other of the special sciences. Each level of description will pick out just one of 
the many different kinds of structures that are in play at any one time. Jaworski says: 
“Biological, psychological, social, chemical, and physical phenomena do not 
exist in separation from each other in real human behaviour; they together 
constitute a single zone of psychophysical activity. The mental-psychical 
dichotomy is at best a logical construction, one that abstracts from the way 
psychological, social, physical, and other phenomenal are incorporated into real 
human behaviour.” . 70
Similarly, Jaworski says that his account “… does not treat the mental-physical 
distinction as canonical, but simply as an artefact of our descriptive and explanatory 
interests” . These references to the mental-psychical dichotomy being at best a logical 71
construction or the mental-physical distinction being simply an artefact should not be 
understood as casting doubt on the realist interpretation of Jaworski’s hylomorphic 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 170. 68
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 7, where Jaworski implicitly claims this virtue for his theory. 69
 Jaworski (2011), p. 307. 70
 Jaworski (2016), p.173.71
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structures. I take Jaworski’s point to be that on a particular occasion when we direct 
our attention on ‘a single zone of psychophysical activity’ like Jon we choose to focus 
on different kinds of structures, calling for different kinds of explanations, depending on 
our different explanatory interests. In this way we pick out only one of the many 
different levels of structure that are relevant to the behaviour of this zone of 
psychophysical activity at any one time. There is no problem with this provided we do 
not assume that there is a radical ontological distinction between, for example, the 
mental and the physical. Ultimately all there is are basic particles and different 
hylomorphic structures or configurations of such particles. What is distinctive about, for 
example, how Jon structures the powers of his parts arm-raising-wise is not the 
ontological status of the higher level structures involved but that this way of structuring 
the powers of his parts is subject to a particular type of evaluation, namely, rational 
evaluation. 
4.13 As suggested at the end of Section 3, Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the 
mind-body relation can be seen as an attempt to develop a non-physicalist theory that 
combines the advantages of the different types of physicalist theory. Like the identity 
theory physicalists, Jaworski can claim to provide a realist view of the mental. In 
Jaworski’s theory the truth makers for explanations citing mental properties are distinct, 
causally efficacious, higher level hylomorphic structures. Like the relaxed physicalists, 
Jaworski can claim that his theory avoids the commitment to any systematic 
(isomorphic) correlations between the mental and physical, supervenience being 
sufficient to keep the psychological and physical explanations in step. Also like the 
relaxed physicalist, Jaworski can claim that his theory is compatible with the 
uncodifiability of the rational and with externalist concerns. Jaworski’s theory takes full 
account of the nature of our psychological explanatory practices. The psychological 
explanation of why Jon raised his arm, for example, shows how that action fits into 
Jon’s overall pattern of rational behaviour. The norms of rationality are incorporated into 
our explanatory practices and the hylomorphic structures that we latch onto when we 
provide psychological explanations have a distinctive kind of causality that reflects such 
practices. Similarly, Jaworski’s theory can explain the relevance of social and 
environmental context in psychological explanations. The explanation that Jon raised 
his arm because he wanted to catch a taxi and believed that this action would achieve 
the desired result is only explanatory in an environment where a taxi is within Jon’s 
visual range, the social setting provides for taxis and taxi hailing and so on. If Jon had 
configured the manifestation of the powers of his parts arm-raising-wise in a different 
social setting then the explanation of Jon’s action, and thus the causal factors and 
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relations mapped by that explanation, would have been different. Finally, like both the 
identity theory physicalists and the relaxed physicalists, Jaworski can claim that his 
theory is consistent with the causal closure of the physical world. Jaworski’s attempt, 
however, to combine the realism of reductive physicalism with the sensitivity of relaxed 
physicalism to the distinctive nature of our psychological explanatory practices exposes 
his hylomorphic theory to criticism. His critics will say that Jaworski’s realist credentials 
are based on a defect in his general ontological framework, which relies on an 
unjustified move from explanatory pluralism to ontological pluralism. Jaworski, they will 
say, hypostases the relaxed physicalist’s causally relevant psychological properties. I 
consider this charge against Jaworski’s ontological framework in the next Section. 
5. AN ASSESSMENT OF JAWORSKI’S HYLOMORPHISM AS A GENERAL 
METAPHYSICAL THEORY 
5.1 In this Section I carry out the first stage of the assessment of Jaworski’s 
hylomorphism, considering the merits of the metaphysical framework within which he 
situates his theory of the mind-body relation. As discussed in the previous Section, the 
difference between Jaworski’s hylomorphic worldview and that of his physicalist rivals 
centres on Jaworski’s structural realism. Jaworski expresses this realism with the 
following slogans: 
Structure matters: it operates as an irreducible ontological principle, one that 
accounts at lest in part for what things essentially are.
Structure makes a difference: it operates as an irreducible explanatory principle, 
one that accounts at least in part for what things can do, the powers they 
have .72
Structure matters in that an individual is only the individual that it is because of its 
individual making structure and an activity is only the activity that it is, say throwing a 
ball, if the structured individual configures (structures) its parts and surrounding 
materials ball-throwing-wise. Structure makes a difference because structures are 
powers so that if an object has a structure it has powers that it would not otherwise 
have. At the same time Jaworski claims that this view of higher level hylomorphic 
structures is consistent with the laws of physics, including causal closure. Despite such 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 3; discussed in relation to individual-making structure at pp. 72
97 et seq. and in relation to activity-making structure at pp. 159 et seq. These are two 
of the four slogans that Jaworski uses to set out the theoretical roles that he attributes 
to structure. I set out the third slogan (structure counts) later in this Section. The fourth 
(structure minds) is set out in Section 4. 
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structures the super physicist can describe the world at the fundamental level of basic 
particles with complete accuracy, tracing the movement of each basic particle as it 
interrelates with its fellow particles, without noticing the difference that structure makes. 
Jaworski’s causal pluralism plays the central role in his theory of ensuring that his 
hylomorphic structures make a causal difference but without disturbing the movement 
of the basic particles. But by seeking to render his structural realism compatible with 
the physical world in this way Jaworski opens himself up to the charge that he is 
attempting to get his realism ‘on the cheap’, that he is offering what Kim calls a “free 
lunch” solution - a solution at minimal philosophical cost . In the first part of this 73
Section I develop this charge by arguing that Jaworski is potentially enough of a realist 
to expose himself to a conceivability or zombie style argument but not enough of a 
realist to avoid epiphenomenalism. I close this part of the Section by considering 
Robinson’s criticism that, in effect, Jaworski’s causal pluralism is just explanatory 
pluralism with an unjustified ontological gloss . I conclude that none of these 74
arguments against Jaworski’s position are conclusive. Nevertheless they put pressure 
on Jaworski to justify his structural realism. In the second part of this Section I run an 
argument on Jaworski’s behalf, drawing on his principle of composition, that attempts 
to provide such a justification. 
Criticisms of Jaworski’s structural realism   
Zombie structures
5.2 The basic form of a conceivability or zombie style argument is as follows :75
(1) P and ~Q is conceivable 
(2) If P and ~Q is conceivable then P and ~Q is metaphysically possible 
(3) If P and ~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false
——————————
(4) Materialism is false. 
P is taken to be the conjunction of all microphysical truths and Q a phenomenal truth. 
The argument is directed at materialist claims that the phenomenal reduces to or 
 See Kim (1998), p. 59. 73
 See Robinson (2014). 74
 See Chalmers (2010), chapter 6. I say more about conceivability arguments in 75
Section 6 when considering the hard problem of consciousness. 
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otherwise supervenes upon the microphysical, the fundamental level of basic particles, 
with their basic properties and relations. But because Jaworski claims that his 
hylomorphic structures are properties that are ontologically distinct from but 
supervenient upon the microphysical he opens himself up to the same kind of 
argument, with Q now expressing a truth about hylomorphic structure and the 
conclusion being that his hylomorphism is false .76
5.3 Jaworski claims, for example, that his hylomorphic theory of individual-making-
structure is committed to the following strong metaphysical supervenience thesis: 
Structo-physical supervenience: For any possible worlds w1 and w2, and any 
physical materials, x1, x2, …,xn in w1 and y1, y2, …, yn in w2, if the xs at time t 
are exactly similar to the ys at time t* in respect of the kinds of properties and 
relations that can be exhaustively described and explained by physics, then the 
xs compose an individual at t if and only if the ys compose an individual at t* 
that is structurally exactly similar to x at t .77
Assume that the xs in w1 compose Jon. On Jaworski’s account of individual-making 
structure this means that Jon is configuring the xs human-wise, that is, he is imposing 
individual-making structure on them. The structo-physical supervenience thesis rules 
out the ys in w2 being arranged in exactly the same way as the xs and being in all 
respects the same in respect of the properties and relations that can be described 
exhaustively by physics and yet not composing a replica of Jon, so that Jon’s replica, 
Jon*, is a structure zombie. Jaworski says that he regards the structure zombie 
scenario “as absurd, but I confess that I do not have an argument to show that [the 
scenario is] impossible. I can only hope to appeal to relevant intuitions” . But is the 78
scenario absurd? After all, Jaworski is committed to such self-configuring activity, the 
instantiation of individual-making structure, being ontologically distinct from the 
underlying arrangement of basic particles and their properties. If the self-configuring 
activity is genuinely numerically distinct from the underlying arrangement why can’t it 
be instantiated in w1 but not w2, contrary to the structo-physical supervenience? 
Perhaps, for example, the ys in w2 come together human-wise at time t* due to a freak 
 Jaworski expresses the close non-identity relation between his hylomorphic 76
structures and the physical world in terms of a series of strong necessitation and 
supervenience relations - see Jaworski (2016), chapter 9.
 Jaworski (2016), p. 187. 77
 Jaworski (2016), p.188. 78
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natural occurrence and then are immediately dispersed. It does not seem so absurd in 
this scenario to argue that whilst the xs compose Jon at time t because their 
arrangement is a stable arrangement resulting from Jon’s self-configuring activity, the 
ys do not compose Jon* at t* because there is no self-configuring activity going on in 
w2, just a chance, unstable, arrangement of the ys. This freak of nature scenario, 
however, may just reveal a problem with the way Jaworski formulates his structo-
physical supervenience thesis, which is set out purely synchronically in terms of the 
covariation of the xs and their supervening individual-making structure at a particular 
time. Individual-making structure has a dynamic aspect as well as a synchronic aspect. 
It accounts for the unity and persistence of a structured individual over time. So 
perhaps the formulation of the thesis needs to provide for the physical history of the xs 
and ys to be the same at all times leading up to time t/t*. After all, I presume that what 
Jaworski really finds absurd is the scenario where the ys in w2 could have physical 
characteristics exactly similar to the xs in w1 over time, and so appear to compose 
Jon* over time, with the same powers as Jon and seemingly engaging in activities 
exactly similar to Jon, but that nevertheless whilst the xs composed Jon, a structured 
individual, Jon* is a structure zombie.
5.4 Jaworski’s vulnerability to the zombie argument arises because his hylomorphic 
structures are ontologically distinct from the physical properties on which they 
supervene. And the problem that he has when appealing to our intuitions is that his 
structures do not interfere with the behaviour of the world as described by physics. So 
if we invest our super physicist with creative powers it seems initially both conceivable 
and possible that It could create worlds w1 and w2 so that they ran according to the 
laws of physics and then forget to add the distinct hylomorphic structures or add them 
to w1 but forget to add them to w2. From the super physicist’s point of view such 
forgetfulness would not affect the behaviour of the worlds, which would still run in 
accordance with the laws of physics. Jaworski can give the standard argument to the 
zombie style argument. Given his structo-physical supervenience thesis, even if P and 
~Q is conceivable (with Q being a structural truth) it is not metaphysically possible. 
Once the super-physicist has fixed the physical properties then no further creative 
activity is required to fix the hylomorphic structures. Nevertheless a concern remains 
that all that Jaworski has done is assert that the physical and structural properties 
modally co-vary without really explaining why this should be the case. Jaworski opens 
himself up to the zombie argument because of his move from explanatory pluralism to 
ontological pluralism. Reductive physicalists, who deny this move, are also vulnerable 
to zombie arguments, at least in relation to the co-variation of phenomenal mental 
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properties and physical properties (as I will discuss in Section 6). But if, as they claim, 
mental properties are numerically identical to physical properties they have a 
straightforward account of why once the physical properties have been fixed the mental 
properties are fixed. And relaxed physicalists also have a straightforward way of 
dealing with the argument. If two possible worlds are exactly similar in respect of the 
kinds of properties and relations that can be exhaustively described by physics, there 
could be no justification for different descriptions and explanations in the special 
sciences . In the above scenario Jon and Jon* will be described and explained in 79
exactly the same way. To justify a different attribution of psychological properties to 
Jon*, for example, would require Jon* having different behavioural dispositions from 
Jon and thus, ultimately, a different physical constitution. Jaworski, however, with his 
move from explanatory to ontological pluralism, lacks such a straightforward 
explanation of the modal co-variation between his distinct hylomorphic structures and 
the underlying physical properties.
Epiphenomenalism 
5.5 A related problem for Jaworski is explaining how his hylomorphic structures can 
make a difference by accounting in part for what things can do, the powers they have, if 
they do not interfere with the behaviour of the world as described by physics. This 
raises the concern that Jaworski’s structures are epiphenomenal. Jaworski considers 
the charge of epiphenomenalism as part of his consideration of what he calls “Williams’ 
worry”, the worry that “hylomorphism emerges as just a polite form of materialism” . 80
Jaworski sets out one form of this worry as follows: 
“Hylomorphism claims that the behaviour of structured individuals like us never 
violates the laws governing their fundamental physical constituents… But if 
structured individuals can never violate fundamental physicals laws, then it 
seems it must be impossible for our thoughts and feelings to make any causal 
difference to our behaviour. … Hylomorphism must be committed, therefore, to 
something like epiphenomenalism. Even if there are structures that elude 
 This needs to be qualified because different explanatory interests may lead to 79
different descriptions and explanations. But the point holds if one holds such interests 
fixed. 
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 213 et seq. for a list of forms Williams’ worry could take. 80
The quote is from Williams (1986), p. 224. 
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physical description, the things we do, our behaviour, can still be exhaustively 
explained by appeal to physics alone.” .81
Jaworski’s response relies on his causal pluralism. He says that the epiphenomenalism 
charge assumes that “in order to make a difference to things, higher-level causal 
relations must conform to the models of causation described by physics” . But as we 82
have seen, according to Jaworski even though, given his commitment to strong 
supervenience, the higher and lower level differences must be correlated these 
“correlations between higher- and lower- level differences … do not depend on higher-
level phenomena conforming to models of causation in physics” . When, for example, 83
Jon raises his arm to catch the taxi he imposes activity-making structure on the 
manifestation of the power of his parts. But this imposition does not violate the laws 
governing his fundamental physical constituents - the basic particles . This would only 84
be the case if the imposition of structure was a causal process of the same kind as 
causal processes at the fundamental level, a form of downward causation. It is this kind 
of response, however, which requires Jaworski’s hylomorphic structures to be higher 
level sparse properties and yet not to disturb the behaviour of the basic particles at the 
fundamental level, that gives rise to the concern that Jaworski wants to have his 
realism on the cheap.
Is explanatory pluralism enough to justify or constitute the real efficacy of the non-basic 
level?
5.6 The suspicion that Jaworski wants to have his realism on the cheap is the basis 
of Robinson’s criticism of Jaworski and his fellow modern hylomorphists . Robinson 85
questions whether it is possible to combine a realist interpretation of hylomorphic 
structure with closure under physics, as modern hylomorphists like Jaworski seek to 
do. Robinson says that there are two ways of interpreting the reference to the 
structures that appear in the explanations of the special sciences. The realist 
interpretation of structure, adopted by hylomorphists like Jaworski, treats such 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 214. Jaworski labels this as ‘Worry 6’. 81
 Jaworski (2016), p. 292. 82
 Jaworski (2016), p. 293. 83
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 161 “… given reasonable assumptions, activity composition 84
implies that the behaviour of structured individuals never violates the laws governing 
their fundamental physical constituents”. 
 Robinson (2014).85
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structures as sparse properties that enable their bearers to enter into causal relations. 
The conceptualist interpretation of structure denies the realist interpretation. For 
conceptualists, although structures figure in the explanations given by the special 
sciences this is just a different way of conceptualising the basic level of reality 
described by physics. There are no real, ontologically distinct, structures in the world 
corresponding to the structures given in special science explanations. The only real 
structures are what I have been calling microphysical structures. This is the physicalist 
position on structure. Robinson’s argument is that it is only if one adopts the 
conceptualist interpretation that one’s position will be consistent with the world being 
closed under physics. As we have seen, Jaworski relies on his causal pluralism to 
reconcile his structural realism with the world being closed under physics. Robinson 
claims, however: 
“What one has, in fact, is an explanatory pluralism, with causation adopted into 
the domain of explanation; the wholly external, mind-free element is force and 
this is exclusively micro.  So Jaworski is really only claiming that, once one 
realises that most explanations are causal explanations, explanatory pluralism 
is pluralism enough to constitute or ground a full causal realism about all levels. 
…one may wonder whether explanatory pluralism is enough to justify or 
constitute the real efficacy of the non-basic level.” . 86
The alternative conceptualist interpretation is, as Robinson says: “… that, in so far as 
causation by complex structures belongs in the explanatory theories of the special 
sciences, it is not part of concrete reality, but of a certain mode of understanding it” .87
5.7 Jaworski expressly replies to Robinson’s criticism . His reply, however, is in 88
many ways just a restatement of his position on structural realism. Jaworski argues that 
the structures referred to by the special sciences are not identical to, cannot be 
reduced to, the microphysical structures that can be exhaustively described by 
 Robinson (2014), p. 4 (italics in original). 86
 Robinson (2014), p. 5. 87
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 289 et seq. 88
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physics . So physics cannot take over the explanatory role of the special sciences. But 89
Robinson (and the physicalists) can go along with this part of Jaworski’s argument, 
they can accept explanatory pluralism. Jaworski requires something more to rebut 
Robinson’s challenge. Jaworski argues that the explanatory pluralism justifies 
hylomorphism’s ontological pluralism: 
“The idea that explanatory schemes of the special sciences do not express 
genuine causes but that the explanatory schemes of physics do, introduces an 
asymmetry in the general picture of how explanations are related to causes. If 
explanations map onto causes, and different kinds of explanations map onto 
different kinds of causes, then there is a unified account of the relation between 
causes and explanations. Robinson suggests something different: only some 
kinds of explanatory schemes map onto causes. But why? What justifies this 
claim? …An answer would follow straightforwardly if the only causes that 
existed were forces - if, in other words, the causal pluralism that hylomorphists 
endorse were false. But then why should we accept this claim?” .  90
So Jaworski is accusing Robinson of begging the question against him. If one assumes 
that the only causes are the forces of physics then the special sciences do not describe 
causes of other sorts. At most there is just explanatory pluralism. But this is the very 
point at issue and cannot be assumed at the start of the argument. One might argue, 
however, that the way that I have set up the ontological framework within which this 
debate is taking place already establishes, as a starting point at least, an asymmetry in 
how explanations are related to causes. If we start off with the basic particles and their 
basic properties and arrange the particles in increasing levels of complexity, why 
should we think that this adds to the kind of causal relations in the world? Is the burden 
of proof not on causal pluralists like Jaworski?
 Jaworski addresses this point as part of his consideration of what he labels as ‘Worry 89
1’, the worry that biological structures are just complex relations amongst physical 
materials whose properties and relations can be exhaustively described by physics - 
see Jaworski (2016), p. 251. Jaworski says “… none of these properties or relations is 
the kind of dynamic higher-level structure that belongs to the subject matter of biology, 
psychology, or other special sciences”.  
 Jaworski (2016), p. 292. 90
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Hylomorphic and physicalist principles of composition
5.8 The criticisms of Jaworski’s position considered in the first part of this Section 
are intended to show that there is pressure on Jaworski to provide further justification 
for his structural realism and the causal pluralism on which it is based. In this part of 
this Section I run an argument on Jaworski’s behalf that seeks to justify his structural 
realism on the basis that it provides a satisfactory solution to the composition problem, 
one not available to physicalists. As Heil says, an important yardstick of an ontology’s 
merit lies in its application, its power to resolve philosophical problems in a natural 
way . If Jaworski’s hylomorphic ontology has the power to resolve the composition 91
problem in a natural way this will provide some justification for his structural realism 
and ultimately for his mind-body theory based on this structural realism. 
Van Inwagen and the special composition question
5.9 In Section 2 I introduced van Inwagen’s special composition question: when is it 
true that for some object y, the xs compose the y? where ‘the xs’ is treated as a plural 
referring expression referring to two or more basic particles. Having rejected the 
extreme answers to this question, mereological nihilism and universalism, van Inwagen 
considers and rejects the following restricted composition answers: to get the xs to 
compose something one need only (1) bring them into contact; (2) cause them to be 
fastened to one another; (3) cause them to cohere; (4) cause them to fuse. I will not go 
into van Inwagen’s reasons for rejecting these positions in any detail. But a flavour of 
his reasoning can be given by first looking at what he says in relation to contact. He 
asks “If I bring two cubes into contact so that a face of one is conterminous with a face 
of the other, have I thereby brought into existence a solid that is twice as long as it is 
wide? Or have I merely rearranged the furniture of the earth without addition to it?” . 92
Van Inwagen says that although in such a simple case there may appear to be no 
ontologically correct answer, as if it were a matter of convention which answer we 
adopted, in other cases it is clearer that mere contact is not sufficient to produce a new 
(composite) object, such as when two people shake hands. Similarly in relation to the 
other proposed answers. Thus cohesion produces a relatively stable relation; if the 
blocks were glued together they could not be pulled apart. But if the two handshakers’ 
hands are covered in glue they do not thereby come to compose a composite object. 
 See Heil (2003), p. 14.91
 Van Inwagen (1990), p 35.92
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And so on. The rejection of these answers to the special composition question rules out 
some of the answers that could be given in purely physicalist terms. 
5.10  Having rejected these forms of restricted composition, van Inwagen presents 
his own answer to the special composition question: there is some object y such that 
the xs compose y if and only if the activity of the xs constitute a life . Like the restricted 93
composition answers that he rejects, van Inwagen says that this answer depends only 
on the spatial and causal relations that the basic particles, the xs, bear to one another. 
But in the rejected answers van Inwagen says that the causal relation of the xs is no 
more than a disposition to retain their relative spatial positions. In van Inwagen’s 
answer the causal relation of the xs does more than this, it constitutes a life. The 
consequence of the sufficient part of van Inwagen’s answer (the xs compose y if their 
activities constitute a life) is that in addition to, over and above, the xs and their 
activities there is a y, a living organism. The activities of the xs bring into existence a 
new object, a composite object, rather than merely rearranging the furniture of the 
earth without addition to it. The consequence of the necessary part of van Inwagen’s 
answer (the xs compose y only if their activities constitute a life) is that the only 
composite objects are living organisms. There are no tables and chairs etc. Van 
Inwagen spends some time addressing the denial of the literal (as opposed to virtual) 
existence of such artefacts. For present purposes, however, I am concerned with the 
consequences of the sufficient part of the answer. Why should we take the activities of 
the xs to constitute an additional object, y, a composite object, over and above the xs? 
Why should we not say that more properly from an ontological point of view we should 
just talk of the collective activities of the xs, so that it is clear that the y is merely a 
virtual object like the tables and chairs?
5.11  Van Inwagen argues for his position in two ways. His broader type of argument 
focuses on the way the position deals with various philosophical problems concerning 
material objects, such as their identity and persistence through mereological change, 
as illustrated by the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus. These problems insofar as they 
relate to artefacts concern the necessary part of van Inwagen’s answer (the nihilist 
part) and are not directly relevant for present purposes. The narrower type of argument 
 See van Inwagen (1990), p. 82.  Van Inwagen says that in the last analysis it is the 93
business of biology to say what a life is - see p. 84. He suggests, however, that it can 
be regarded as a particular type of “unimaginably complex self-maintaining storm of 
atoms” - p. 87.
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supports the sufficient part of van Inwagen’s answer and is relevant . Van Inwagen’s 94
narrower argument has two parts. The first part addresses the Cartesian sounding 
question: why should I suppose that I exist? In this context the question asks why can’t 
sentences about me, such as ‘I exist’ or ‘I think’, not be paraphrased into sentences 
that refer only to simples (basic particles), as is the case for artefacts ? Van Inwagen 95
answers this question by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the activities of an 
arrangement of simples that can be explained in terms of their joint collective activity 
rather than as the product of a single composite object and, on the other hand, 
activities that need to be explained in terms of a single composite object. The activities 
of an arrangement of simples arranged shelf-wise, for example, can be explained in 
terms of their collective activity, there is no need to posit a composite object, a shelf, 
over and above the arrangement of simples to explain how they support books 
(simples arranged book-wise). But, says van Inwagen “I do not see how we can regard 
thinking as a mere cooperative activity …  things can work together to think only in the 
sense that they can compose, in the strict and mereological understanding of the word, 
an object that thinks” . From this van Inwagen concludes, in Cartesian fashion, that he 96
therefore exists. Therefore there is at least one case in which there is a composite 
material being with parts. The second part of the narrower argument says that this 
shows that a composite material being is actual and therefore possible but does not 
explain how it is possible. And, argues van Inwagen, the fact that I think does not have 
to be part of the explanation. Van Inwagen looks elsewhere for the explanation of how 
simples combine to compose composite objects. Van Inwagen concludes “It seems to 
me to be plausible to say that what binds them together is that their activities constitute 
a life, a homeodynamic storm of simples, a self-maintaining, well-individuated, jealous 
event.” .97
 Chapter 12 of van Inwagen (1990) draws this distinction between broader and 94
narrower types of argument and contains van Inwagen’s narrower arguments, of which 
he says “These arguments are perhaps rather weak, but I do not think them entirely 
worthless …” (p. 115).
 As van Inwagen puts it in relation to thinking: “Why couldn’t we introduce a variable 95
polyadic predicate - say, ‘the xs are arranged intellectually’ - and paraphrase talk 
apparently about thinkers into talk that refers only to simples?” - van Inwagen (1990), p. 
117. 
 van Inwagen (1990), p. 118. This is similar to one of Kant’s arguments in the Critique 96
of Pure Reason for a fixed and abiding subject of consciousness. Kant says 
accompanying each representation of consciousness with a different subject would be 
like distributing the words of a verse between different beings, which would fail to make 
up a whole thought. See Kant (1781), A352.
 Van Inwagen (1990), p. 121. A jealous event is an event that cannot share its 97
constituent particles. 
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5.12 Van Inwagen’s argument relies on the distinction between what can be called 
collective properties and emergent properties. A collective property of an arrangement 
of basic particles is a property that can be understood in terms of the joint effect of the 
basic properties of the basic particles manifesting their powers in concert. In this case 
there is no need to posit a composite object as property bearer of a distinct higher level 
property; the property bearers are the individual basic particles. A property that cannot 
be understood in this way can be called an emergent property. O’Connor and Jacobs 
describe this distinction, using the terminology of structural and non-structural 
properties. They say that: 
“A property is ‘non-structural’ [emergent in my terminology] if and only if its 
instantiation does not even partly consist in the instantiation of a plurality of 
more basic properties by the entity or its parts. There is nothing remotely like a 
‘realisation’ relation holding between the emergent states and complex, lower-
level physical states, whether conceived as tokens or types.” .98
Kim also employs the structural/non-structural distinction, making use of the notion of a 
structural property when explaining the idea of micro-structural properties . Kim says: 99
“Having a mass of ten kilograms is a property of certain aggregates of molecules, like 
my coffee table. And it is a micro-[structural] property of the table in the following 
sense: for my table to have this property is for it to consist of two parts, its top and its 
pedestal, such that the first has a mass of six kilograms and the second a mass of four 
kilograms.” . So, according to Kim, the table’s property of having a mass of ten 100
kilograms is the micro-structural property R(six kilograms (top), four kilograms 
(pedestal)), where R is the relation of being arranged table-wise. But, on the approach 
to properties and composition now being considered, there is no composite object, the 
table, instantiating the property of having ten kilograms, in addition to (over and above) 
the tables parts, its top and pedestal, and their properties. And the same analysis 
would apply all the way down to the fundamental level of basic particles. Van Inwagen 
expresses this idea in terms of two men, Tom and Tim, carrying a beam, saying: “… it 
is no argument for the thesis that Tom and Tim have a mereological sum to point out 
that they are carrying a beam: Tom’s activity and Tim’s activity are jointly sufficient to 
 O’Connor and Jacobs (2003), p. 541. 98
 See Kim (1998), p. 84.99
 Kim (1998), pp. 83-84. Kim refers to a ‘micro-based property’ but this is synonymous 100
with ‘micro-structural property’, a term that Kim uses elsewhere. 
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account for the fact that the beam remains aloft …” .  The same point is also made by 101
van Inwagen’s bookshelf example referred to above. But, according to van Inwagen, an 
emergent property (activity) like life or thinking cannot be understood as consisting 
merely in the instantiation of a plurality of more basic properties by the living-thinking 
organism’s parts, as a mere cooperative activity in van Inwagen’s terminology. In the 
case of an emergent property there is a distinct property, over and above the properties 
of the organism’s parts, and a distinct bearer of that property. The bearers in the mass 
case are the parts of the table and ultimately the individual basic particles. The bearer 
in the living-thinking case, is, according to van Inwagen, a composite object, a living, 
thinking substance. 
5.13 This approach to composition, with its reliance on the distinction between 
collective and emergent properties, has parallels with Merricks’ sparse approach to 
material objects, although Merricks’ argument for his position is different from van 
Inwagen’s . Merricks uses what he calls ‘the Overdetermination Argument’ to argue 102
that artefacts like baseballs do not exist in addition to basic particles arranged baseball-
wise . This argument purports to show that a baseball, if it existed, would be causally 103
irrelevant because anything that it was a candidate to have caused would be caused by 
its constituent particles acting in concert. Here ‘acting in concert’ plays the same 
theoretical role as the idea of the collective properties of an arrangement of basic 
particles. Thinking beings like us escape such elimination according to Merricks 
because we have causally non-redundant mental properties that allow us to cause 
things that our basic particles acting in concert do not cause . So mental properties in 104
Merricks’ argument play the theoretical role that I am claiming for emergent properties. 
5.14 On this approach to properties and composition, the suggested relation 
between an emergent property and the bearer of that property, what I will call an 
emergent object or bearer , is: 105
 Van Inwagen (1990), p. 118. 101
 See Merricks (2001). 102
 See Merricks (2001), chapter 3.103
 See Merricks (2001), chapter 4.104
 Note that the emergent object is a composite object composed of the basic particles 105
not an emergent substance as in substance dualism. On this distinction, see O’Connor 
and Jacobs, p. 548. 
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(1) The instantiation of an emergent property is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of its emergent bearer.
This is van Inwagen’s answer to his special composition question. For van Inwagen, 
the instantiation of the emergent property of life is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of a living organism, a composite object. This relation between 
emergent properties and emergent objects can also be expressed as follows:
(2) The existence of the emergent bearer is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the instantiation of the emergent property. 
The anti-physicalist nature of this approach to composition should be clear. If a 
collective property of an arrangement of basic particles is a property that can be 
understood in terms of the joint effect of the basic properties of the basic particles 
manifesting their powers in concert then it will be a property that can be exhaustively 
described by physics. This is why the physicalist Kim can be comfortable with his 
micro-structural properties. Such collective properties are entirely consistent with a 
physicalist’s ontology. Conversely emergent properties will not be so describable and 
so will, as I am understanding physicalism, be inconsistent with a physicalist’s ontology. 
And this will be the case even if the emergent properties supervene on the basic 
properties instantiated by basic particles in complex arrangements. On this approach to 
composition physicalists are faced with having to posit an austere ontology without 
emergent properties or emergent objects - an extreme form of eliminativism.
Jaworski and the special composition question
5.15 Jaworski says that the hylomorphic view of composition that he develops most 
closely resembles van Inwagen’s view . Jaworski’s answer to the special composition 106
question is based on his theory of individual-making structure discussed above: 
“composition occurs when and only when an individual configures materials: there is a 
y such that the xs compose a y if and only if y is an individual that configures the xs” . 107
Thus, as for van Inwagen, for Jaworski composition requires an emergent property (an 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 98. Robinson explains the motivation of modern 106
hylomorphism as a response to van Inwagen’s special composition question. Robinson 
says that this question prompted the thought amongst the modern hylomorphists that 
there may be a way of answering the question based on composite objects having the 
right kind of hylomorphic structure. See Robinson (2014), p. 2. 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 104.107
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individual-making structure conferring the power to configure materials) resulting in an 
emergent composite object, a structured individual, as the bearer of that property. My 
power to impose individual-making structure, to be able to configure the materials that 
compose me human-wise, is not a property that can be understood as a collective 
property, that is, in terms of the joint effect of the basic properties of my constituent 
basic particles manifesting their powers in concert. Jaworski makes this point in relation 
to the imposition of structures, whether individual-making or activity-making, when he 
says: 
“The structure that makes something a piano is not produced by pieces of wood 
and mental; it is instead something imposed on the wood and metal. Likewise, 
say hylomorphists, brains do not generate or produce thoughts, feelings or 
actions. The latter are instead coordinated manifestations of the powers of 
brains …” .108
So the power to impose individual-making structure is an emergent property. Jaworski 
says that like van Inwagen’s approach to composition: “The hylomorphic view is also 
committed to property pluralism. It implies that structured individuals have properties of 
at least two sorts: properties due to their individual-making structures … and properties 
due to their materials alone, independent of the ways they are structured” . The 109
properties of a structured individual that are due to their materials alone, independent 
of the ways they are hylomorphically structured, are collective properties. These are 
the result of the materials manifesting the powers that they would have outside of their 
hylomorphic structural environment and thus ultimately the powers that the materials 
have that fall within the remit of physics. The properties due to a structured individual’s 
individual-making structures are the emergent properties. Jaworski himself refers to 
such properties as emergent properties and says that: “… emergent properties are not 
aggregative properties such as mass. … emergent properties are not possessed by 
any of an individual’s parts since the individual-making structure responsible for them is 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 277. 108
 Jaworski (2016), p. 106. 109
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not a feature of any one part considered in isolation; it is instead a feature of the whole 
those parts compose.” .110
5.16 There are differences between van Inwagen’s and Jaworski’s approach to 
composition. Van Inwagen does not espouse hylomorphism or causal pluralism. And 
Jaworski describes his ontology as less revisionary than van Inwagen’s . For van 111
Inwagen the only proper parts of a living organism are its basic particles and cells 
whereas Jaworski accepts that there are also functional parts such as eyes, hearts and 
kidney’s. Jaworski’s reasons for admitting these organs into his ontology is his 
ontological naturalism; our biological descriptions and explanations posit such parts, 
which are thus part of its ontological commitments. For present purposes, however, the 
similarities between van Inwagen  and Jaworski in relation to composition are more 
important. First, both their principles of composition rely on emergent properties and 
are thus not available to the physicalists. Secondly, both Jaworski and van Inwagen 
provide for the supervenience of the emergent properties on the properties of the 
emergent object’s parts . Thirdly, both their principles of composition provide a 112
dynamic as well as a synchronic conception of composition. Jaworski’s individual-
making structure accounts for what composite objects (individuals) essentially are at 
any particular time. This synchronic aspect of individual-making structure is reflected in 
the structo-physical supervenience thesis. And individual-making structure accounts for 
the unity of composite objects over time. Jaworski’s slogan for the dynamic aspect of 
individual-making structure is:
Structure counts: it explains the unity of composite things, including the 
persistence of one and the same living individual through the dynamic influx 
and efflux of matter and energy that characterise many of its interactions with 
the wider world .113
 Jaworski (2016), p.107. Structured individuals could also have properties of a third 110
sort if their constituent particles had latent powers that only manifested themselves 
when the particles were arranged together in certain complex ways. Such powers 
would fall outside of the remit of physics but their collective effect would be due to the 
particles acting in concert and there would be no need to explain it as the effect of an 
emergent property.
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 109. 111
 I discussed Jaworski’s structo-physical supervenience above. Van Inwagen says 112
that he is strongly inclined to think that the properties of organisms supervene on the 
properties of their parts - see van Inwagen (1990), p. 90.
 Jaworski (2016), p. 18.113
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As Jaworski says: 
“An individual living thing does not configure exactly the same materials for very 
long since those materials are in constant flux, yet despite this, the individual 
maintains itself one and the same through all the changes on account of its 
ongoing configuring activity. That activity is what unifies various materials into a 
single individual, both synchronically and diachronically, just as lives do on van 
Inwagen’s account.” . 114
It is the combination of the synchronic and diachronic aspects of structure that arguably 
provides the ontological resources for an attractive principle of composition, particularly 
the diachronic aspect. Jaworski’s approach to composition has the same anti-
physicalist nature as van Inwagen’s approach to composition. There are, of course, 
other possible non-physicalist approaches to composition, like those of van Inwagen 
and Merricks discussed  above. But for present purposes, if we focus just on the 
debate between Jaworski and the physicalists, we potentially have an argument that 
provides some justification for Jaworski’s structural realism and a basis for preferring 
Jaworski’s ontology to that of the physicalists.
The physicalists and the special composition question - a physicalist rejoinder
5.17 The assumption that Jaworski’s hylomorphism (or at least some form of non-
physicalist ontology) is required to provide an acceptable principle of composition can, 
of course, be challenged by the physicalists. As explained in Section 3, the super 
physicist representative of physicalism does not have to be both an explanatory monist 
and an ontological monist. It can operate with the conceptual resources of the special 
sciences and join our conversations recognising the distinctions between living things 
and nonliving ones, or mental beings and non-mental ones. It’s just that, in doing so, 
the super physicist does not accept any ontological commitments over and above 
those of physics. In particular, It adopts Robinson’s conceptualist interpretation of the 
structures that figure in the explanations of the special sciences; they are just a 
different way of conceptualising the basic level of reality described by physics. And, as 
noted in Section 2, physicalists are not committed to object monism despite their 
commitment to property monism. A physicalist can adopt a position of restricted 
composition whereby: there is some object y such that the xs compose y if and only if 
 Jaworski (2016), pp. 105-106. 114
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they satisfy condition C,  where C can to be exhaustively described by physics . To be 115
acceptable as a principle of composition for minded creatures like us, however, and 
thus to provide an acceptable alternative to Jaworski’s (or some other non-physicalist’s) 
principle of composition, C would need to be able to explain our unity and persistence 
as composite objects throughout the dynamic influx and efflux of physical materials 
during our lifetimes. The issue for the physicalists is whether they can provide a 
principle of composition that is acceptable in this way whilst at the same time being 
consistent with their physicalist ontology.
5.18 Here is my attempt at a physicalist principle of composition that meets these 
requirements. Assume that the super physicist’s conceptual resources include Fine’s 
theory of rigid and variable embodiment . Fine introduces the concept of rigid 116
embodiment to deal with ‘composite objects’ that do not change their constituent parts, 
such as a water molecule that always possesses the same hydrogen and oxygen 
atoms .  Fine says: 117
“Given objects a, b, c, … and given a relation R that may hold or fail to hold of 
those objects at any given time, we suppose that there is a new object - what 
one may call ‘the objects a, b, c, … in the relation R’ … An object of this special 
sort will be called a rigid embodiment … The relation R will then be called the 
principle of rigid embodiment …” .118
A water molecule is a rigid embodiment of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms suitably 
bonded. Fine also introduces the concept of variable embodiment to deal with 
composite objects that do change their parts. Fine gives as an example water in a river. 
Fine says:
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 226. 115
 See Fine (1999). Given that Fine describes his theory of embodiment as a version 116
of hylomorphism (Fine (1999), p. 62) it might seem odd that I am attributing this theory 
to the super physicist, who is intended to represent the physicalist position. Fine’s 
theory can, however, to use Koons’ terminology, be characterised as a version of faint-
hearted hylomorphism (see Koons (2014)) which, according to Koons, collapse into 
‘mere materialism’ (Koons (2014), p. 2). 
 I have put ‘composite objects’ in scare quotes because many of the objects covered 117
by Fine’s concepts of embodiment will not be composite objects on more restricted 
accounts of composition, such as those of van Inwagen and Jaworski. Having made 
the point, however, I’ll drop the scare quotes from now on.  
 Fine (1999), p. 65 - italics in original. 118
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“In the case of the variable water [that is, the variable quantity of water that is in 
a river], there is a function or ‘principle’ that determines which quantity of water 
constitutes the variable water at any given time … it picks out, at any time t at 
which the river exists, the quantity of water in the river at that time … there is a 
new kind of whole corresponding to this principle, a whole that exists when and 
only when the principle picks out some water and that is constituted at any such 
time t by the quantity of water picked out by the principle at t. … In general, we 
will suppose, given any suitable function or principle F (taking times to things), 
that there is a corresponding object standing in the same relationship to F as 
the variable water of the river stands to its principle. We will call this object the 
variable embodiment of F and designate it by /F/.” .119
In order to give us an intuitive grip on the notion of variable embodiment Fine asks us 
to imagine a container into and out of which water flows. We thus have (a) the 
container, (b) the water that is in it at any given time, and (c) the container with the 
water in it. Now assume, says Fine, that the container somehow actively determines 
what water is in it at any one time and that it is not a physical object but conceptual in 
nature, so that the variable contents of the container are determined by conceptual 
rather than physical means. This, says Fines, provides “a pretty good model for our 
notion of variable embodiment, with the container being the principle of embodiment F 
and the container-cum-content being the variable embodiment /F/.” . Finally, Fine 120
combines his two theories of embodiment. At each time at which a variable 
embodiment exists, that is, at each time at which the variable embodiment of F, (/F/), 
exists, it is constituted by a rigid embodiment. F thus takes times to rigid embodiments: 
at time t1 variable embodiment /F/ is composed of rigid embodiment1, at t2, /F/ is 
composed of rigid embodiment2, and so on.  
5.19 When developing his theory of hylomorphic structure, Jaworski says: 
“As we gaze out at the vast sea of matter and energy that is or will be described 
by our best physics, we see in it numerous localised pockets of organisation or 
order - semi-stable, self-maintaining warps or vortices of physical material. 
 Fine (1999), pp. 68-69 - italics in original. 119
 Fine (1999), p. 69. 120
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According to hylomorphists, each of these vortices is a distinctive individual, 
paradigmatically an organism.” . 121
He goes on to say that to understand these vortices or organisms we need to 
understand the physical materials that are caught up into them but that this in itself will 
not enable us to understand what sets the structured wholes apart as organisms, 
distinct from the inanimate materials that surround them. To understand this “there 
must be some further principle that accounts for the unity and also the persistence of 
structured wholes… According to hylomorphists … [this] requires understanding their 
structures.” . My suggestion on behalf of the physicalists is that, armed with Fine’s 122
theory of rigid and variable embodiments, their representative, the super physicist, can 
converse with the hylomorphists as they gaze out together at the vast sea of matter 
and energy with its semi-stable, self-maintaining warps or vortices of physical material. 
Within this sea of matter and energy Jon raises his arm to catch a taxi. The super 
physicist can treat Jon as a variable embodiment. At each time at which Jon exists he 
will be constituted by a rigid embodiment, consisting of the basic particles that 
compose him standing in relation R . Armed with its complete knowledge of the 123
fundamental physical materials, the super physicist can work out function F, which will 
map the future rigid embodiments constituting Jon. This function F is Jon’s principle of 
embodiment and Jon is the variable embodiment /F/. All of this is consistent with the 
super physicist’s ontology. From the super physicist’s point of view there is nothing 
special about this particular variable embodiment but by employing function F in this 
way the super physicist is able to discuss Jon with the hylomorphists without making 
any ontological concessions. In this way the super physicist, representative of the 
physicalist position, is able to provide a physicalist principle of restricted composition. 
And this principle, employing the concept of variable embodiment, is a dynamic 
principle; it can account for the unity and persistence of variable objects like Jon 
despite the constant influx and efflux of materials that compose him. In this way the 
super physicist can seek to provide a physicalist principle of restricted composition that 
finds a place for composite objects like Jon within a physicalist ontology. It could then, 
for example, adopt relaxed physicalism to attribute psychological properties to Jon as 
part of its causal explanations of Jon’s behaviour.
 Jaworski (2016), p. 93. 121
 Jaworski (2016), p. 94. 122
 This is similar to the way in which the table in Kim’s example is treated as the bearer 123
of the micro-structural property R(six kilograms (top), four kilograms (pedestal)). 
 55
5.20 If this attempt at a physicalist principle of composition works then it seems that, 
despite Fine’s hylomorphic label, his theory of embodiment can be employed by the 
physicalists to provide a restricted principle of composition, with the structures referred 
to in the special sciences being, in Robinson’s terminology, interpreted conceptually. 
Fine himself says that one of the consequences of his theory is that there will be a 
conceptual element to the identity of many material objects, with R, the principle of rigid 
embodiment, and F, the principle of variable embodiment, being conceptual in 
nature . I take this to mean that the arrangements of basic particles that are picked 124
out by R and F are just different ways of conceptualising the basic level of reality 
described by physics, with some of the arrangements corresponding to our folk or 
scientific conceptions of material objects whilst others are purely gerrymandered 
objects. As Fine says, a consequence of his theory under its most plausible 
development is that there will be many more material objects than commonly 
supposed . Koons puts this point as follows: Fine’s universe would be inhabited by “ 125
… a vast number of ontological monsters, many of which will share exactly the same 
material components at at least one point in time.” . But is this really an acceptable 126
principle of composition? Jaworski’s hylomorphic structures reflect the ontological 
commitments of the special sciences, drawing on our best descriptions and 
explanations of reality. On Jaworski’s account, there is a principled (rather than merely 
conventional) ontological distinction between Jon, a structured individual, and the 
inanimate materials that surround him or one of Fine’s ontological monsters . Those 127
who like to think that there is a principled distinction between living organisms and 
inanimate materials or the mereologists’ gerrymandered ontological monsters may be 
inclined to favour Jaworski’s principle of composition over those available to the 
physicalists, such as the one that I have suggested above on their behalf, and, at least 
on this basis, favour his hylomorphic worldview over theirs. 
 See Fine (1999), p. 73. The physicalist employment of Fine’s principles require this 124
interpretation of Fine as a faint-hearted hylomorphist in Koons’ classification - see 
above. Koons’ says that Fine’s theory could be interpreted as a stalwart version of 
hylomorphism, where structure is given a realist interpretation. See Koons (2014), p. 4. 
On the stalwart interpretation Fine’s principles would be real substantial forms - sparse, 
causally efficacious, forms like Jaworski’s structures. The physicalists could obviously 
not employ Fine’s principles on a stalwart interpretation. 
 See Fine (1999), p. 73.125
 Koons (2014), p. 3. 126
 And the same can be said in relation to van Inwagen’s and Merricks’  accounts. 127
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Does Jaworski succeed on composition where the physicalists fail?
5.21 My claim on Jaworski’s behalf on the basis of his principle of composition 
should be understood as a conditional claim: if an acceptable principle of composition 
requires non-physicalist ontological resources, and if Jaworski’s hylomorphic ontology 
supplies those resources, then this provides one way of justifying his hylomorphic 
worldview, with its structural realism. I do not claim to have discharged these conditions 
but only to have suggested arguments favouring Jaworski’s hylomorphic principle of 
composition. To the extent that these arguments are successful it suggests that 
physicalists do not have the ontological resources to distinguish living organisms, such 
as human beings, from artefacts. As we have seen, van Inwagen can be regarded as a 
nihilist so far as artefacts are concerned. He offers paraphrases of everyday sentences 
about artefacts into sentences that refer only to simples. From the ontological point of 
view of the non-physicalists, the super physicist armed with the concepts of rigid and 
variable embodiment is like the nihilist in offering paraphrases of sentences about 
living, minded, creatures like us into sentences that refer only to simples. Van 
Inwagen’s response to the nihilist’s challenge in relation to the composition of minded 
creatures like us is that thinking cannot be treated as a mere cooperative activity in this 
way. Thought, for van Inwagen, is an emergent property requiring an emergent 
(composite) object as its bearer. This is why, on van Inwagen’s approach, artefacts like 
computers cannot think: “They cannot think because they do not exist” . I am 128
suggesting that Jaworski adopt the same line against the physicalists as van Inwagen 
adopts against the nihilist. There is (ontologically) more to living composite organisms 
like us than there is to artefacts like computers. And to explain this requires emergent 
hylomorphic structures. 
5.22 For Jaworski’s hylomorphic worldview to be able to draw support from the 
argument that an acceptable principle of composition requires non-physicalist 
ontological resources, however, it would need to be shown that his version of 
hylomorphism supplies those resources. And this returns us to the potential criticism of 
Jaworski’s realist credentials referred to earlier: that his move from explanatory 
pluralism to ontological pluralism is unjustified and that he is trying to have his realism 
on the cheap. This criticism can be brought out by comparing Jaworski’s emergentism 
with that proposed by O’Connor and Jacobs . O’Connor and Jacobs argue that a 129
person’s experiences and other conscious mental states are plausibly emergent (non-
 Van Inwagen (1990), p. 118. 128
 See O’Connor and Jacobs (2003). 129
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structural) properties, and that such emergent properties cannot be instantiated by a 
person conceived of as merely the mereological sum of their parts, with these parts 
collectively instantiating the emergent properties. To instantiate such emergent 
properties, they say, we need to treat persons as composite wholes. So far there is 
nothing in O’Connor and Jacobs’ account that Jaworski (or van Inwagen) would 
disagree with. Indeed Jaworski cites their paper when developing his principle of 
hylomorphic composition in support of the principle, which he shares, that any view 
committed to emergent properties must posit emergent individuals as well . There is, 130
however, a significant difference between what O’Connor and Jacobs regard as 
emergent properties and van Inwagen’s and Jaworski’s treatment of emergent 
properties. O’Connor and Jacobs say that: 
“Since the initial emergent states themselves will help to determine similar 
subsequent states … the microphysics alone will not determine these later 
states. Likewise, emergent states will work in tandem with the underlying micro-
states to determine later micro-states, manifesting a sort of ‘downwards’ 
causation. Hence the existence of emergent states is contrary to the 
assumption of much contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind, 
assumptions which typically include the truth of some fairly strong mental-
physical supervenience thesis and the causal closure of the the microphysical 
realm. Neither of these assumptions will hold if there are emergent states as 
here defined.” .131
So the emergent properties that O’Connor and Jacobs have in mind are what one 
might call strong emergent properties (or more tendentiously ‘real’ emergent 
properties). Properties that affect the microphysical goings on at the fundamental level. 
O’Connor and Jacobs criticise van Inwagen’s view of emergent properties as properties 
of organisms that supervene upon the properties of their parts. If this is van Inwagen’s 
view of emergent properties, O’Connor and Jacobs say, then they: 
“… fail to see the force of [van Inwagen’s] remarks against the thesis that 
thinking is a cooperative activity among non-thinking simples. If persons are 
objects that have no emergent mental features [in O’Connor and Jacobs’ sense 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 104, footnote 6. 130
 O’Connor and Jacobs (2003), p. 542. For the development of this type of 131
emergentism see O’Connor and Wong (2005). 
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of emergent], then it seems that thinking must be a co-operative project 
between the simples that compose them.” . 132
They go on to explain their theoretical goal as being to admit only those composites 
which do fundamental causal work . O’Connor and Jacobs use Leibniz’s mill thought-133
experiment to compare composite objects with strong emergent properties, like us, with 
complex arrangements of simples that lack such properties and “are individual objects 
only by a courtesy born of practical concerns” . In the latter case, the Leibnizian 134
shrunken observer (let’s say a shrunken super physicist) walking around the merely 
complex arrangement of simples, let’s say a computer, would be able to apprehend the 
local interactions of the basic particles “unconstrained in any fundamental way by non-
derivative macroscopic forces … The effect … would be a quite reasonable dissolution 
of the sense of tight unity which unaided perception reinforces” . But, say O’Connor 135
and Jacobs, on van Inwagen’s view of emergent properties the effect would be the 
same when the shrunken observer walked around a living system. A shrunken observer 
walking around an emergent composite object with strong emergent properties, on the 
other hand, would notice a qualitative or dynamic difference between the two 
complexes, the computer and the living system. Strong emergent properties can thus 
be said to ground a genuine difference between living composite objects and non-
living, stable arrangements of basic particles . So for O’Connor and Jacobs it is 136
strong emergent properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
emergent objects. 
 O’Connor and Jacobs (2003), p. 554. 132
 This chimes with Merricks view on composite objects - see Merricks (2001), p. 60. 133
Whilst Merricks rejects downward causation in relation to artefacts like baseballs, he 
accepts it in relation to us and our mental properties. This is why we are not causally 
redundant and so survive elimination by his Overdetermination Argument. His 
argument is: “that the existence of some objects with causally relevant properties 
(namely, objects with conscious mental properties) does not supervene on 
microphysical doings. Because of that … we should say that some of what those 
objects cause, in virtue of having those properties, lack microphysical causes” - p. 110. 
 O’Connor and Jacobs (2003), p. 547. 134
 O’Connor and Jacobs (2003), p. 547. 135
Arguably basic particles with latent powers that only manifest themselves when the 136
particles are arranged together in certain complex ways would be sufficient to explain 
the shrunken observer’s different experience without having to rely on emergent 
powers. But the point remains that, if O’Connor and Jacobs are right, van Inwagen’s 
and Jaworski’s emergent properties are neither necessary nor sufficient for emergent 
objects. 
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5.23 So the question once again is whether Jaworski’s causal pluralism and the 
structural realism that he develops on the back of that pluralism can do the theoretical 
work that Jaworski requires of it. Are his hylomorphic structural properties ‘real enough’ 
to enable him to answer the special composition question in a more acceptable way 
than the answers available from within a physicalist ontology? This is Robinson’s 
concern, referred to above, as to “whether explanatory pluralism is enough to justify or 
constitute the real efficacy of the non-basic level”. I take it that, other things being 
equal, it is an advantage to posit a theory of higher-level properties that is consistent 
with physics and causal closure. And it seems to me that it remains an open 
metaphysical question whether strong emergent properties are required for something 
that deserves the name of higher level property realism or for the purpose of providing 
an adequate principle of composition. All of the ontological theories on offer must pay a 
price for their ontological commitments. The physicalists make the least ontological 
commitments but, if my arguments in this part of this Section are successful, they do so 
at the cost of not being able to provide an acceptable principle of composition. Strong 
emergentists like O’Connor and Jacobs have the ontological resources to provide such 
a principle but they take on the largest empirical burden. They implicitly assume that 
there is only one kind of causation, the kind described by physics, so that the 
dispositional powers of emergent properties are supposed to operate like the forces 
described by physics. But their opponents say that there are good empirical grounds 
for denying that there are any such emergent forces resulting from emergent 
properties . Jaworski can be seen as attempting to steer a middle ground, with 137
sufficient ontological commitments to enable him to provide an acceptable principle of 
composition, on the one hand, whilst avoiding the empirical burden of the strong 
emergentists, on the other hand. To the extent that he is successful this provides 
justification for endorsing his hylomorphic worldview.  
6. AN ASSESSMENT OF JAWORSKI’S HYLOMORPHIC THEORY OF THE 
MIND-BODY RELATION
6.1 In Section 5 I carried out the first stage of my assessment of Jaworski’s 
hylomorphism and his mind-body theory by considering the merits of his hylomorphic 
worldview. The second stage of my assessment requires considering the merits of 
 For a response to this point see O’Connor and Wong (2005), pp. 673-674. Whereas 137
the postulation of emergent chemical or biological properties may be particularly 
vulnerable to empirical refutation, O’Connor and Wong argue that matters are different 
with respect to psychological properties, where there is positive evidence favouring 
their strong emergent properties. 
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Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation and, in particular, whether it 
does a better job of solving the mind-body problems relating to mental causation and 
the hard problem of consciousness than rival physicalist theories. At the end of Section 
3 I suggested that Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation could be 
seen as an attempt to develop a non-physicalist theory of the mind-body relation that 
combined the advantages of the different types of physicalist theory whilst avoiding 
their disadvantages. And in Section 4 I argued that Jaworski succeeded in that attempt 
insofar as his theory could be seen as providing, on the one hand, a realist view of 
mental phenomena, with the truth makers for explanations citing mental properties 
being distinct, causally efficacious, higher level hylomorphic structures, whilst, on the 
other hand, taking full account of the nature of our psychological explanatory practices. 
So, on the merits, there are reasons to prefer Jaworski’s mind-body theory over the 
theories of his physicalist rivals. I concluded Section 4, however, by claiming that the 
success of Jaworski’s theory depended on him being able to justify what I called his 
realist credentials. And in Section 5 I considered whether such justification was 
available. 
6.2 In this Section I concentrate on how Jaworski and his physicalist rivals purport 
to solve the mind-body problems relating to mental causation and the hard problem of 
consciousness. The problem of mental causation relates to the psychological or public 
conception of the mental, the concept of the mind as the causal or explanatory basis of 
behaviour. The hard problem of consciousness relates to the phenomenal or private 
conception of the mental, the subjective, qualitative aspect of the mind. A complete 
theory of the mind-body relation needs to be able to solve the problems relating to both 
of these aspects of the mental. If Jaworski’s theory of the mind-body relation has the 
power to resolve these problems in a natural way this will provide justification for both 
his mind-body theory and the hylomorphic ontology on which that theory is based. 
Consideration of how Jaworski and the physicalists deal with the problems of mental 
causation and the hard problem of consciousness completes the second stage of my 
assessment of Jaworski’s hylomorphism and his mind-body theory. In the final part of 
this Section I consider, on the basis of this assessment, whether Jaworski has 
succeeded in showing that his hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation should be 
taken seriously - at least as seriously as more familiar physicalist alternatives. 
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Mental causation 
6.3 Mental causation is at the core of theories of the mind-body relation. Explaining 
how the mind and the body could causally interact is in large part explaining how they 
are related. And given the Eleatic Principle and the sparse view of properties that I 
have adopted, the existence of the mind depends on the possibility of mental 
causation. I am assuming that both physicalists and non-physicalists like Jaworski 
accept that psychological explanations of behaviour, like explaining why Jon raised his 
arm in terms of his beliefs and desires, are causal explanations. In parallel with such 
psychological explanations, however, there are also physical explanations of bodily 
movements such as Jon’s arm rising, based on a chain of physical events running from 
Jon’s motor cortex through to his arm muscles, and ultimately on a chain of events at 
the fundamental level of physics. Explaining how these two types of explanation and 
the properties that they cite are related gives rise to the problem of mental causation. 
6.4 One version of the problem of mental causation problem, the exclusion 
problem, can be formulated in terms of the following jointly inconsistent claims:
(1) Actions have mental causes 
(2) Actions have physical causes 
(3) The mental and physical causes of actions are distinct
(4) If actions have multiple causes, then they are overdetermined
(5) Actions are not overdetermined
Jaworski’s discussion of the problem of mental causation concentrates on the 
exclusion problem and the above formulation of the problem is his . My consideration 138
of mental causation will focus on the exclusion problem, using Jaworski’s formulation.
6.5 Kim uses the exclusion problem to support reductive physicalism . He says 139
that given that most of us will not want to give up on mental causation, claim (1) above, 
the “issue is how to make our metaphysics consistent with mental causation, and the 
choice that we need to make is between various metaphysical alternatives” . Kim 140
chooses to deny claim (3). According to the substance-attribute ontology that I have 
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 275. 138
 See, for example, Kim (1998), chapters 2 and 4 and Kim (2005), chapters 1 and 2. 139
 Kim (1998), p. 62. Italics in original. 140
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adopted, causes are events and events are property instantiations. Two events are 
numerically identical if they consist of the same individual (basic particle or composite 
object) instantiating the same property at the same time. So event identity requires 
property identity. If mental and physical properties are distinct then mental and physical 
events and thus mental and physical causes are distinct . So when Kim denies claim 141
(3) he is denying that mental and physical properties are weakly or strongly modally 
distinct. This is the metaphysical alternative that Kim choses - reductive physicalism. 
The question for present purposes is whether Kim’s way of reconciling the five claims 
in the above formulation of the exclusion problem provides a basis for endorsing his 
theory of the mind-body relation (and thus, also, his reductive physicalist worldview). 
Kim claims that the “… exclusion argument shows that property dualism is not able to 
explain how mental causation is possible; instead of saving mental causation, it ends 
up relegating mental phenomena to the status of epiphenomena.” . For Kim, property 142
dualism includes any position where mental properties are strongly or weakly modally 
distinct from physical properties, and thus equates with what I am calling property 
pluralism. If Kim is right this constitutes a decisive blow against property pluralists and 
their mind-body theories. Unfortunately for Kim, his property pluralist rivals, including 
Jaworski, have their own ways of solving the exclusion problem, so that the problem 
does not provide a way of choosing between the various competing worldviews and 
mind-body theories. 
6.6 Starting with Kim’s rivals in the physicalist camp, token-token identity theorists 
can follow Kim in rejecting claim (3). For functionalists who treat mental properties as 
higher order properties (higher order predicates) and relaxed physicalists who do not 
treat mental properties as sparse properties the potential competition between mental 
and physical properties on which the exclusion argument relies does not arise . There 143
are other mind-body theories that Kim would regard as non-reductive physicalist 
positions but which are not treated as physicalist positions under Jaworski’s 
interpretation of physicalism. These are non-reductive physicalists who are also 
 This relation between properties, events and causes is explained by Jaworski at 141
(2016), p. 275. 
 Kim (2005), p. 158. 142
 Davidson’s anomolous monism (see, for example, Davidson (1970)) also avoids the 143
potential for competition between mental and physical properties. Davidson is a 
nominalist so far as properties are concerned. For him an event is mental if it can be 
described using mental predicates and physical if it can be described using physical 
predicates. The mental-physical distinction is a distinction between predicates rather 
than properties. So Davidson could deny claim (3). There are just events, which can be 
described using mental and physical predicates but act as causes simply as events. 
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property pluralists because they hold that mental properties are weakly modally distinct 
from physical properties. Kim claims that the exclusion argument shows that these non-
reductive physicalist positions are unable to explain how mental causation is possible. 
But proponents of these positions deny this. For example, Bennett defends non-
reductive physicalists who posit weakly modally distinct mental properties against the 
exclusion problem by denying claim (4), the overdetermination claim . Fodor would 144
also presumably say that overdetermination is not a problem if one of the supposedly 
competing causes is the implementing mechanism for the other. 
6.7 Predictably Jaworski relies on his causal pluralism to deal with the argument. 
He claims that the “… distinction among kinds of causal relations enables 
hylomorphists to solve the problem of mental causation in an attractive way.” . 145
Jaworski’s causal pluralism allows him to rewrite claims (1) to (3) of the exclusion 
argument as follows:
(1’) Actions are rationalised by thoughts, feelings and/or perceptions 
(2’) Muscular contractions are triggered by events in the nervous system.
(3’) Rationalising causes and physiological triggers are distinct.
Like Bennett and Fodor, Jaworski then rejects claim (4). Overdetermination for the 
purposes of the exclusion argument requires two or more causes of the same kind, as 
when two members of a firing squad both shoot the person being executed, with each 
shot arriving at the same time and being sufficient to kill the person. Rationalising 
causes and physiological triggers are different kinds of causes and are thus non-
competing causes. With this re-interpretation, the claims of the exclusion argument are 
rendered unproblematically consistent. Jaworski acknowledges that his kind of solution 
to the exclusion problem, which relies on positing non-competing causes for actions, is 
not new . It is, as he says, a species of the dual explanandum strategy. Rationalising 146
and triggering explanations address two different explananda: actions and 
physiological mechanisms, respectively. But Jaworski claims that his use of this 
strategy has the virtue of setting it within an overall metaphysics which makes it clear 
how such explanations and their corresponding causes fit together. The physiological 
mechanisms involved when Jon raises his arm, for example, are distinct from Jon’s 
 See Bennett (2003).144
 Jaworski (2016), p. 281. 145
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 282 et seq. 146
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action of raising his arm. The physiological mechanisms could be triggered without the 
arm raising, for example, if the triggering occurred due to a spasm or as a result of 
outside interference by the super physicist. The manifestations of the powers of the 
physiological mechanisms only composes the action of Jon raising his arm if Jon 
coordinates the manifestations arm-raising wise by imposing activity-making structure 
on them. Jon’s imposition of structure is one kind of cause on Jaworski’s account 
explaining and causing the action, and the triggering of the physiological mechanisms 
is another kind of cause explaining the arm movement. Two distinct explanandum with 
two distinct explanations and causes. 
6.8 In this way Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation does allow 
him to provide an attractive solution to the exclusion problem. If, however, as I have 
suggested above, his physicalist rivals can also solve the exclusion problem in a 
satisfactory way then the problem of mental causation, as set out in the exclusion 
argument, does not provide a way of choosing between Jaworski’s theory and those of 
his physicalist rivals. Jaworski suggests that he can at least use the exclusion 
argument to knock out his non-physicalist emergentist rivals. He claims that 
“emergentists have difficulty solving the problem of mental causation in a satisfactory 
way” . So one strategy for Jaworski would be to try and use the exclusion argument 147
to knock out the emergentists, his main non-physicalists rivals, and then to use other 
arguments to try and knock out his physicalist rivals. Strong emergentists, like 
O’Connor and Jacobs referred to above, however, have their own answer to the 
exclusion argument. On their account an action can be partly caused by mental causes 
and partly by physical causes without overdetermination in the same way as the joint 
effect of jointly sufficient different physical causes does not lead to overdetermination. 
This allows them to reject claim (4) of the exclusion problem. They can put forward this 
solution because they do not accept causal closure. Not accepting causal closure may 
be problematic but to question this part of the strong emergentist’s theory is to 
challenge their theory directly rather than via the exclusion argument. 
The hard problem of consciousness
6.9 Chalmers says that “The hard problem of consciousness … is that of explaining 
how and why physical processes give rise to phenomenal consciousness?” . The 148
hard problem is said to contrast with the easy problem of consciousness, where the 
 See Jaworski (2016), pp. 274-276 for his argument; the quote is at p. 276. 147
 Chalmers (2010), p. 105. 148
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explanandum can be given a functional explanation . It is a conceptual fact, says 149
Chalmers, that the psychological aspects of the mental are functionally definable. And 
once a mental phenomenon has been functionalised it is then just a question of 
identifying the computational or neural mechanisms that carry out the function. This 
accords with Kim’s approach to functional reduction discussed above. But, says 
Chalmers, this sort of functional or reductive explanation fails for consciousness. Even 
when we have explained all of the associated functions a further question remains: why 
is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? Take pain as an 
example. Pain has both psychological and phenomenal-qualitative aspects. It is the 
sort of state that tends to be produced by bodily damage and result in pain behaviour - 
its psychological aspect. But there is also the particularly unpleasant feel of pain, of 
what it is like to be in pain - its qualitative aspect. Chalmers’ claim is that whilst we can 
in principle provide a reductive explanation of the psychological aspect of pain in terms 
of the mechanisms that link its inputs and behavioural outputs, this explanatory method 
is incapable of explaining pains qualitative aspect. 
6.10 The hard problem challenges those physicalists who claim to be able to provide 
a complete account of the mental. The very nature of physicalism seems to prevent 
physicalists from providing anything other than functional accounts of mental 
phenomena. But the hard problem is also a problem for Jaworski’s mind-body theory. 
As we have seen, on Jaworski’s account “thinking, feeling, perceiving, intentionally 
acting, and other activities that philosophers typically categorise as mental or 
psychological are all structured manifestations of powers” . When I throw a baseball I 150
“coordinate the activities of my muscles, nerves and things in the environment … I 
cause all of these things to manifest their powers in the way it takes for me to throw a 
baseball” . Similarly, on this account, when I stub my toe I presumably cause my 151
neurones, muscles, nerves and so on to manifest their powers in the way it takes for 
me to be in pain. But this gives rise to the hard problem. It is easy to see why the 
coordinated manifestation of these powers constitutes the psychological aspect of pain 
but why should such coordination be accompanied by the feeling of pain? On 
Jaworski’s account the coordination must be so accompanied because feeling pain just 
is a structured manifestation of powers. But this sounds just like the physicalist who 
identifies phenomenal states with certain functional states. And like the physicalist who 
 For Chalmers discussion of the hard and easy problems see Chalmers (2010), 149
chapter 1.
 Jaworski (2016), p. 170. 150
 Jaworski (2016), p. 158. 151
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claims to be able to give a physicalist account of the phenomenal, Jaworski’s mind-
body theory implies various supervenience theses that mean that if two possible 
worlds, w1 and w2, are exactly similar in respect of the kinds of properties and relations 
that can be exhaustively described by physics, then they are necessarily identical in 
terms of their phenomenal properties. For Jaworski, Jon in w1 and his physical replica, 
Jon* in w2, will have the same parts  with the same powers , and if Jon coordinates 152 153
the powers of his parts pain-wise then so does Jon* . This commonality between 154
Jaworski and the physicalists make them similarly vulnerable to Chalmers’ refined 
version of the conceivability argument, discussed below, a common vulnerability that 
Jaworski acknowledges . In what follows I first look at Chalmers’ refined 155
conceivability argument. I then consider Jaworski’s response to the argument. I claim 
that, even if Jaworski’s response is successful, it is not a specifically hylomorphic 
response; his physicalist rivals can run a similar response. And, in any case, it still 
leaves the hard problem of explaining why physical activities or the coordination of 
such activities should be accompanied by feelings. I then consider ways in which 
Jaworski and the physicalists might seek to offer such an explanation, drawing on 
Chalmers’ reference in the conceivability argument to Russellian monism. 
Chalmers’ refined conceivability argument 
6.11 Chalmers’ refined conceivability argument runs as follows :156
(1) P and ~Q is 1-conceivable.
(2) If P and ~Q is 1-conceivable, then P and ~Q is 1-possible. 
(3) If P and ~Q is 1-possible, then P and ~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is 
true.
(4) If P and ~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.
————————————
 This follows from the structo-physical supervenience thesis discussed in Section 5.152
 This follows from the hylomorphic power supervenience thesis - see Jaworski 153
(2016), p. 183.
 This follows from the hylomorphic activity supervenience thesis - see Jaworski 154
(2016), p. 183. 
 Jaworski acknowledges that Chalmers’ conceivability argument applies to 155
hylomorphism at p. 257. 
 The argument is set out in Chalmers (2010), chapter 6, and discussed by Jaworski 156
in Jaworski (2016) at pp. 257 et seq. 
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(5) Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true. 
Here materialism covers all accounts that make the mental supervenient on the 
physical and so includes Jaworski’s hylomorphism as well as physicalism. P is the 
conjunction of all microphysical truths about the universe. Q is a truth about 
phenomenal consciousness, which I will take to be a truth about the instantiation of the 
phenomenal aspect of pain. 
6.12 The argument relies on the two dimensional approach to semantics. On this 
approach terms have both primary and secondary intensions. An intension is a function 
that takes possible worlds as arguments and gives extensions as values. Take ‘water’ 
as an example. We fix the referent (the extension) of ‘water’ using the characteristics 
that we associate with water - its being the clear, colourless, odourless, drinkable liquid 
that fills rivers etc. We fix the primary intension of ‘water’ by reference to centred 
worlds. We take a possible world as a centred world, Cw. We then ask what reference 
is fixed when a speaker in Cw refers to water in Cw. If the centred world is the actual 
world, then ‘water’ refers to H2O. If the centred world is another possible world, where 
the clear, colourless, etc. liquid is XYZ,  then ‘water’ refers to XYZ. So the primary 
intension of ‘water’ takes centred worlds as arguments and gives extensions as values, 
H2O in the one case, and XYZ in the other. We fix the secondary extension of ‘water’ 
by treating the speaker’s world as actual and all other possible worlds as counterfactual 
worlds. So if our world is treated as the actual world, the primary intension of ‘water’ is 
H2O in our world and H2O is the secondary intension in all possible worlds. The 
secondary intension of ‘water’ thus gives the same extension as the value, H2O, for 
any possible world taken as argument. This two dimensional semantics can be used to 
set out different senses of ‘conceivable’ and ‘possible’. The sense in which ‘water is not 
H2O’ is conceivable and possible relies on the kind of conceivability and possibility 
corresponding to primary intensions: 1-conceivability and 1-possibility. We can 1-
conceive that water is not H2O because we can conceive of situations in which the 
primary intension of ‘water’ fixes a reference other than H2O. It is thus 1-possible that 
water is not H2O. But we cannot 2-conceive that water is not H2O because the 
secondary intension fixes the reference of ‘water’ as H2O in all counterfactual worlds, 
where our world is taken as actual. It is not 2-possible that water is not H2O. So the 1-
conceivability that water is not H2O results in its 1-possibility but not its 2-possibility. 
This may seem to bode badly for Chalmers’ refined conceivability argument, which 
needs to go from 1-conceivability to 1-possibility to 2-possibility. Chalmers argues, 
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however, that, given certain assumptions, this move is possible in relation to P and ~Q 
and that this justifies the conclusion of his argument. 
6.13 Chalmers relies on 1-conceivability in Premise (1). Premise (1) says that we 
can conceive of a world, w2, in which the primary intension of P are the microphysical 
properties instantiated in that world, MPw2, and the primary intension of Q is the 
phenomenal property of pain instantiated in that world, Qw2, and MPw2 is instantiated 
but Qw2 is not instantiated, so that P and ~Q is 1-conceivable. And if it is 1-conceivable 
then it is 1-possible - Premise 2. But the 1-conceivability, and thus 1-possibility, of P 
and ~ Q does not on its own threaten the materialist. The materialist claims that there is 
no possible world in which P and ~ Q, where P and ~Q have the same extensions as in 
our world. That is, the materialist’s claim is that there is a necessary co-variation 
between the microphysical properties in our world and the phenomenal properties in 
our world; there is no possible world in which those microphysical properties are 
instantiated and those phenomenal properties are not instantiated. This is a claim 
about the 2-impossibility of P and ~Q. Taking our world, w1, as actual, the primary 
intension of P are the microphysical properties instantiated in our world, MPw1, and the 
primary intension of Q is the phenomenal property of pain instantiated in our world, 
Qw1.  This fixes the secondary intensions of these terms in all possible worlds. 
Materialists claim that there is no possible world in which MPw1 and ~Qw1, that is, that 
P and ~Q is not 2-possible. But, says Chalmers, if P and Q have the same primary and 
secondary intensions then it will be possible to go from 1-conceivability and 1-
possibility to 2-possibility. If the extensions of P and Q are the same in every possible 
world then to 1-conceive of a world where P and ~Q is to conceive of a world in which 
the microphysical and phenomenal properties instantiated in our world, MPw1 and 
Qw1, are not co-instantiated, and that is to conceive of a world where it is 2-possible 
that P and ~Q. 
6.14 To justify Premise (3) Chalmers must thus argue that, unlike ‘water’, P and Q 
have the same primary and secondary intensions. In the case of Q, Chalmers says that 
this is plausible because there is not the same dissociation between appearance and 
reality in the phenomenal case.Thus, unlike the water example, it is plausibly not 
possible for something (Qw2 - pseudo-pain) to resemble pain in all its reference-fixing 
respects, that is, to feel like pain, without being pain. P is more difficult because a 
materialist could ague that we use theoretical roles based on dispositional profiles to fix 
the reference of P-terms. In which case, the primary intension of a P-term like ‘mass’  
would pick out whatever it is in the relevant centred world, w2, that plays the theoretical 
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role that mass plays in our world, w1. Thus the primary intension of ‘mass’ in w2 could 
be pseudo-mass whilst its secondary intension was whatever it is in our world, w1, that 
plays the mass-role - real mass. This could be the case for all microphysical properties, 
so that P had different primary intensions in w1 and w2. But, says Chalmers, this would 
require microphysical properties in w2, like pseudo-mass, to have the same 
dispositional profile as mass in our world, w1, so that pseudo-mass could perform the 
same theoretical role as mass in our world, but to have a different intrinsic quality. And, 
more generally, this would mean that our world and a counterfactual world, w2, could 
instantiate microphysical properties with the same dispositional profiles but with 
different intrinsic qualities, so that the truth of P and ~Q in w2 would establish the 1-
possibility but not the 2-possibility of P and ~Q. On this view what necessitated the 
instantiation of Q in our world would be the instantiation of microphysical properties 
with both their dispositional profiles and intrinsic qualities. And this, says Chalmers, is 
Russellian monism. This explains Chalmers’ disjunctive conclusion. If P and ~Q is 1-
possible, then either P and ~Q is 2-possible, because the microphysical properties are 
exhausted by their dispositional profiles and P (as well as Q) has the same primary and 
secondary intensions, or Russellian monism is true. Once Chalmers has justified 
Premise (3), Premises (4) and (5) straightforwardly follow. 
Jaworski’s response to Chalmers’ conceivability argument 
6.15 What is important for present purposes is not so much the controversy 
surrounding the premises of Chalmers’ argument but whether it provides a way of 
distinguishing between Jaworski’s mind-body theory and those of his physicalist rivals, 
and what it tells us about the hard problem, particularly Chalmers’ use of Russellian 
monism. Jaworski’s response to Chalmers’ argument is to reject Premise (2) and the 
claim that conceivability implies possibility . Like predicates, says Jaworski, not every 157
concept need correspond to a property. And on Jaworski’s view of properties, 
properties constrain the space of metaphysically possible worlds. An inventory of all 
sparse properties (with their property bearers) would determine the realm of possible 
worlds. We might think that we can conceive of a possible world falling outside of this 
realm by using a concept that does not correspond to a sparse property but this would 
be an illusion; there would be no possible world corresponding to the scenario that we 
had conceived of by using that concept. This means that even if we can conceive of a 
scenario in which P and ~Q this does not mean that there is any world in metaphysical 
space corresponding to this scenario. So, contrary to Premise (2), we can’t go from P 
 Jaworski’s response is set out in Jaworski (2016), at pp. 260 et seq. 157
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and ~Q being 1-conceivable to P and ~Q being 1-possible. Compare the case to the 
case where someone claims to be able to conceive of a scenario where there is a 
world, w2, which is physically exactly similar to our world, w1, and where salt in w2 is 
placed in water in exactly similar circumstances in which salt is placed in water in w1, 
but where the salt in w2 does not dissolve. On Jaworski’s view of properties, in which 
the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, there is no possible world 
corresponding to this scenario and so it is not possible to go from the conceivability of 
the scenario, if it is conceivable, to its possibility. Jaworski’s response, however, does 
not provide a way of differentiating Jaworski’s position from his physicalist rivals. 
Jaworski does not claim that his response is new but that: “If there is any novelty in the 
response that I articulate, it is in the way it situates some well-rehearsed points within a 
hylomorphic framework.” . Thus a physicalist, at least one with Jaworski’s theory of 158
properties, could adopt the same response. So even if we assume that Jaworski’s 
response is successful it leaves Jaworski in a similar position here as he was in in 
relation to the exclusion problem. I argued above that the exclusion problem does not 
provide a basis for differentiating Jaworski from his physicalist rivals because both 
Jaworski and the physicalists can claim to be able to solve the problem, albeit in 
different ways. Similarly Chalmers’ conceivability argument does not differentiate 
Jaworski and the physicalists, but in this case because Jaworski’s solution is one that 
is potentially available to his physicalist rivals. More importantly, the proposed solution, 
whether offered by Jaworski or the physicalists, still leaves the hard problem of 
consciousness itself unsolved. Even if Jaworski and the physicalists have a response 
to the conceivability argument they have still not explained why physical activities or 
the coordination of such activities should be accompanied by phenomenal properties. 
To say that such properties are nothing over and above such activities or their 
coordination still seems to leave us with this mystery. 
Russellian monism, the identity theory of powers, and the hard problem
6.16  Chalmers’ conceivability argument invokes Russellian monism to address the 
point that there may be more to physical properties than their dispositional profiles. 
Chalmers describes Russellian monism as “the view that consciousness is constituted 
by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical 
bases of fundamental physical dispositions”. Chalmers says that this view “holds the 
promise of integrating phenomenal and physical properties very tightly in the natural 
 Jaworski (2016), p. 260. 158
 71
world” . Jaworski’s identity theory of powers, which is similar to Russellian monism, 159
potentially holds out the same promise. I introduced Jaworski’s identity theory of 
powers in Section 2. Jaworski  acknowledges that his theory is a version of Heil’s 
identity theory, which claims that every property is both qualitative and dispositional . 160
Heil sets out his identity theory as follows: 
If P is an intrinsic property of a concrete object, P is simultaneously dispositional 
and qualitative; P’s dispositionality and qualitativity are not aspects or properties 
of P: P’s dispositionality, Pd, is P’s qualitativity, Pq, and each of these is P: Pd = 
Pq = P .161
It is open to both physicalists and hylomorphists to adopt versions of the identity theory 
of properties. Physicalist proponents of such a theory could still claim that the basic 
properties of physics are ultimately the only properties that there are. It’s just that 
physics, on this view, only characterises the basic properties in terms of their 
dispositional profiles and that such characterisation does not exhaust their nature. 
Whether such a view satisfies Jaworski’s core thesis of physicalism that everything can 
be exhaustively described by physics may be questionable. For present purposes, 
however, I will assume that both Jaworski and his physicalist rivals can adopt versions 
of Heil’s identity theory and thus potentially use it to address the hard problem of 
consciousness. 
6.17  The problem for physicalists when faced with the hard problem is that they are 
usually operating within a purely dispositional framework. As property monists they are 
committed to an ontology restricted ultimately to the basic properties of physics. If they 
then characterise such properties in purely dispositional terms they are faced with 
trying to analyse the qualitative properties of consciousness in purely dispositional 
terms. If, however, they adopt the identity theory of powers they potentially have a way 
 Both quotes are from Chalmers (2010), at p. 133. 159
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 53.160
 Heil (2003), p. 111. Taylor distinguishes the identity theory of powers from 161
Russellian monism on the basis that Russellian monists “accept views of properties on 
which the qualitative/categorical properties are distinct from dispositional ones” - Taylor 
(2018), p. 61. Italics in original. On this view of Russellian monism it is a different view 
of properties than that proposed by the identity theory of powers. 
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around the hard problem . If all properties are simultaneously dispositional and 162
qualitative then, so the physicalist can argue, it is not surprising that, for example, the 
instantiation of pain has both a dispositional profile and a qualitative feel. By adopting 
the identity theory physicalists will potentially be able to explain not only why pain 
arises from certain stimuli and typically gives rise to certain behavioural responses but 
also why pain has the unpleasant feel that it does. The identity theory of powers also 
provides a straightforward way of dealing with the conceivability argument. If we have 
two ways of characterising the same property, using dispositional and qualitative 
concepts for the same referent, then this explains why we seem to be able to conceive 
of a world in which the instantiation of property P has its dispositional profile but  
different or no qualitative characteristics. But if property P’s dispositionality, Pd, is P’s 
qualitativity, Pq, and each of these is P: Pd = Pq = P, then the conceivability of such a 
world is not a reliable guide to its possibility. This ties in both with Chalmers’ use of 
Russellian monism in the refined conceivability argument and with Jaworski’s claim that 
not every scenario corresponds to a possible world. 
6.18 There are problems, however, for physicalists when they seek to use the 
identity theory of powers in this way. First, the identity theory goes with a sparse view 
of properties. The explanatory relevant properties of the relaxed physicalists could not 
be combined with this theory. Relaxed physicalism only purports to provide a 
physicalist account of the propositional attitudes and the psychological aspect of the 
mental and so this is not a direct challenge to such an account. Assuming, however, 
that there is more to the mental than this, namely its qualitative side, this means that 
relaxed physicalism can at best give only a partial account of the mental. Secondly, 
type or token identity physicalists who seek to avail themselves of the identity theory of 
properties to account for the qualitative aspect of the mental arguably face a problem 
analogous to the problem that I claim that they face in relation to providing a 
satisfactory principle of composition. My discussion of different principles of 
composition in Section 5 above relied on the distinction between collective and 
emergent properties. A physicalist ontology can only provide for collective properties, 
consisting ultimately in the collective instantiation by basic particles in complex 
arrangements of their basic properties. It is unclear how, even with the identity theory, 
physicalists can explain how the instantiation of such collective properties can 
compose one person’s pain. This is analogous to van Inwagen’s claim that thinking 
 On the use of the identity theory to solve the problem of consciousness and the 162
zombie problem from within the physicalist camp, see Heil and Robb (2003), p. 189, 
and Heil (2003), chapters 19 and 20. 
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cannot be regarded as a mere collective activity but must be understood as the holistic 
property of a composite object that thinks. In the phenomenal case, this type of 
criticism has been levelled against panprotopsychists, who propose that fundamental 
physical particles have protoconscious states and then use such states to account for 
the emergence of conscious mental states. As Jaworski says in his consideration of 
this position, panprotopsychism assumes that protomental properties are aggregative 
properties like mass (what I am calling collective properties) and that it is unclear how 
such protomental properties could aggregate to constitute the qualitatively rich 
conscious states of mental creatures like us .  Chalmers raises the same problem in 163
relation to Russellian monism . He says that our phenomenology has an underlying 164
homogeneity and appears to have a single subject of experience. And that it is not easy 
to see “how a distribution of a large number of individual microphysical systems, each 
with its own protophenomenal properties, could somehow add up to this subject of 
experience with a rich and specific structure. Should one not expect something more 
like a disunified, jagged collection of phenomenal spikes?” . 165
6.19 Chalmers goes on to say that some Russellian monists appear to hold that they 
can avoid this combination problem by holding that phenomenal properties are the 
intrinsic properties of higher level physical dispositions. Chalmers says that this view 
seems to be untenable because if the lower (fundamental) level of physics is causally 
closed then the higher level properties will be epiphenomenal. And that the only way to 
avoid this would seem to be to deny microphysical causal closure, so that there are 
higher level properties that are casually efficacious and have phenomenal properties as 
their grounds. Jaworski’s hylomorphism, however, provides an alternative way of 
addressing this problem. Jaworski says that his hylomorphic structures have the same 
characteristics as any other properties within his metaphysics . They must thus 166
comply with his identity theory of powers. And this potentially provides a way of 
explaining why when, for example, I stub my toe and coordinate the activities of the 
relevant neurones, muscles, nerves and so on pain-wise, this coordination could not 
take place without the feeling of pain. On Jaworski’s account this involves an activity-
making structure that, like any property, can be described in both dispositional and non-
dispositional terms. So my claim on Jaworski’s behalf is that his account of hylomorphic 
 See Jaworski (2011), pp. 231 et seq. 163
 See Chalmers (2010), p. 136. 164
 Chalmers (2010), p. 136. 165
 See Jaworski (2016), p. 94. 166
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structure, in combination with the identity theory of powers that he adopts, potentially 
enables him to propose an answer to the hard problem that avoids the combination 
problem that is said to undermine the accounts of the panprotopsychists and 
Russellian monists. As with my proposed claim on Jaworski’s behalf in relation to 
providing a satisfactory principle of composition, however, the question is whether 
Jaworski’s causal pluralism and the structural realism that he develops on the basis of 
that pluralism, can do the theoretical work required of it. Are his hylomorphic structures 
‘real enough’ to be simultaneously dispositional and qualitative in the sense required to 
explain, for example, both our pain behaviour and the qualitative feel of pain? 
Does Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation deserve to be 
taken seriously? 
6.20 This completes my assessment of Jaworski’s theory of the mind-body relation 
and the comparison of his theory with the theories of his physicalist rivals. My 
assessment proceeded in two stages. First I considered the relative merits of 
Jaworski’s hylomorphic theory and various physicalist theories as general metaphysical 
theories or worldviews. Secondly, I compared the merits of Jaworski’s hylomorphic 
theory of the mind-body relation with physicalist mind-body theories. Both stages of the 
assessment concluded that arguments can be made on Jaworski’s behalf supporting 
his hylomorphic theory in preference to the theories of his physicalist rivals but that the 
success of such arguments depend on Jaworski’s realist credentials. Jaworski’s 
hylomorphic theory of the mind-body relation can be seen as an attempt to provide a 
non-physicalist solution that is motivated by the failure of the physicalists to provide 
satisfactory mind-body theories from within their limited ontological resources. His 
attempt rests heavily on his causal pluralism and the hylomorphic structural realism 
that he constructs on the basis of it. I consider that my assessment of Jaworski’s 
hylomorphic mind-body theory has shown that it should be taken seriously, at least as 
seriously as more familiar physicalist theories in the philosophy of mind. Along the way 
I have also referred to grounds for preferring Jaworski’s theory to mind-body theories 
drawing on more robust forms of emergentism or on Russellian monism. The concern 
over his realistic credentials, however, remains and suggests that the final assessment 
of his mind-body theory may be that he has not been prepared to pay a sufficiently 
heavy metaphysical price to enable him more effectively to compete with his physicalist 
rivals. 
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